



Backlash of “Uncamped” Internally Displaced Persons Fleeing Insurgency in the Northern Nigeria and Its Correlation to Fuelling Insecurity and Violence in the South East Region, Nigeria

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Abstract

This study examines the repercussions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing insurgency, such as Boko Haram and Fulani herdsman/farmers conflicts, in the North Region of Nigeria and its impact on insecurity and violence in the South East Region. The research utilizes a doctrinal approach, relying on primary and secondary sources such as the Nigerian Constitution, legal instruments, conventions, books, journals, and articles. The information is analyzed critically, descriptively, comparatively, and evaluatively, highlighting the role of laws and policy frameworks in protecting IDPs. The findings indicate that the influx of uncamped IDPs from the North has given rise to significant challenges, including hunger, homelessness, and a lack of sustainable livelihoods. Government interventions have primarily focused on IDPs in designated camps, neglecting those outside these camps. As a result, desperate individuals have resorted to criminal activities to survive, contributing to security concerns in the South East. The study concludes by recommending collaborative efforts between government agencies and home states to provide social welfare programs, vocational training, and support to alleviate the plight of IDPs and discourage youth involvement in violence. It also proposes redefining the concept of IDPs to suit Nigeria's socio-cultural context and establishing data centers to track returnees. Furthermore, the study advocates for the creation of a South East Development Commission and social security initiatives to address the underlying causes of insecurity and violence in the region.

Keywords *“Uncamped” Internally Displaced Persons; UnCamped IDPs; Insurgency in the Northern Nigeria; Boko Haram Conflict; Herder/Farmer Clash and R2P*

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Introduction

Conflicts and strife constitute the major reason why people flee their homes and become Internally Displaced Persons for the reason that their lives and livelihood stands threatened. One of the challenges facing the Nigerian state today is how to offer succor to Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs), occasioned by the unremitting violent attacks by the Boko Haram, communal conflicts, clashes between farmers and Fulani herdsmen and banditry in the North East, Nigeria. Per to Kofi Annan, the former United Nations (UN) Secretary General, Internally Displaced Persons are the most vulnerable of the human family, with displacement seen as 'the greatest tragedy of our time' facing the global system and the state (Fenella, 2016). Citizens bear the consequences of insurgency, internal conflicts and natural disaster and are left to live a life they never bargained or planned for hence, they bear the title of Internally Displaced Persons in their land of origin. Displacement takes people from their social, educational, economic, and cultural environment and renders them homeless within their country.

Internally Displaced People (IDPs) unlike refugees who flee across national borders do not profit from an organized system of international protection and support. The primary reason why people flee their homes is because of direct threats to their lives. The eventual choice to flee one's own home is usually a painful and agonizing decision laden with uncertainty about what lies ahead. This is why their plights should evoke empathy and care. It is estimated that there are currently 25 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) worldwide, scattered in at least 50 countries over the globe, implying that no continent is spared the scourge. Nigeria has the highest number of displaced persons in Africa which is estimated at 3.3 million people as at the year 2014. Nigeria is ranked behind Syria, with 6.5 million IDPs, and Colombia, with 5.7 million in the world (Itumo and Nwefuru, 2016). Again in 2015, 'Displacement Tracking Matrix' (DTM) set up by Internal Migration Organisation (IOM) observed about 1.5 million displaced persons in Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Adamawa, Bauchi, and Yobe with 94% of the cases caused by Boko Haram while 6% was by inter-communal clashes. Reports credited to the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) recorded additional figures of about fifty thousand internally displaced persons in Plateau, Kaduna, Abuja, Federal Capital Territory (FCT), and Nasarawa in February, 2015 (Cited in Itumo & Nwefuru, 2016). The figure includes those displaced as a result of Boko Haram insurgency, communal conflicts, floods disaster and incessant clashed between farmers and Fulani herdsmen in the northeast. Amnesty International Report (2015/2016), says that Nigeria has over 2 million Internally Displaced People (IDPs) at the end of the year 2016. The report reiterated that it is relevant to also note that some IDP camps are unrecognized by both by the Federal and State governments and therefore not captured in this data. This implies that the figures of IDPs projected by the government are not accurate since data capturing are limited to camps organized or recognized by the government. The total official number of IDPs credited to Boko Haram in 2013 alone was 300,000 people, from the States of Adamawa, Yobe and Borno.

The dilemma of internal displacement has turned out to be one of the most pressing humanitarian challenges, leaving in its wake, massive human rights and security tribulations confronting the international community. Time arises when people and communities confronted with conflict have no further choice than to flee. At such times, the pressure to leave becomes so imminent and unbearable, that the only means to preserve life and dignity is to flee the scene, coming with it the potential for separation, loss of loved ones, homes, livestock, normal way of life, property, physical harm, destitution, and other corollaries. Most people fleeing their homes often times assume that they would return home sooner than later, resulting in their taking only a few things with them. Indeed, many never went back as expected, leading to loss of quite a number of belongings and therefore may depend only on help from friends. Expectedly; in developing countries such as ours, help from national, international and nongovernmental (NGOs) arrive when the situation had already escalated. Insecurity and fighting makes it unfeasible for them to continue to earn a living, access essential services, continue their social and economic endeavours such as tending to their fields and flocks, access markets to buy and sell, enjoy health care services, obtain good water supply, acquire educational and other essential services (Abdulrahman & Muhammad, 2019).

Since Boko Haram insurgents embarked on their campaign of terror against the Nigerian state in the northeast in 2009, internally displaced persons in focus in this context is non indigenes who as it were migrated to north east to do businesses, work in civil and public service, etc. It is the IDPs who are indigenous to the south east. When the hostilities began, government moved the population to IDP camps. While they were in the camps, existential imperatives gravely deteriorated which compelled individuals and families to contemplate on the alternative to

move homewards or other towns or cities considered safer. Even though Nigerian government made efforts to address the plights of IDPs by providing IDPs camps, there are still challenges of overcrowding, poor sanitation, joblessness and insecurity in the IDPs designated camps. The rehabilitation and resettlement plans of the Nigerian government remains unclear; hence deducible inferences from interactions with the Director of IDPs at the National Commission for Refugees, IDPs and Migrants early shows that resettling the IDPs remains an insurmountable task for the Nigerian government. International partners played key roles in matters of their welfare, data collation, health and education of displaced persons.

Displacement disrupts host communities' and stresses housing conditions, health, security, livelihoods education etc., leading to incapacitation on their ability to contribute to their local economies, earn an income, pay rent or taxes, buy goods and invest in their socioeconomic development and for men IDPs catering for self and relatives including loss of self-esteem. Lost production due to internal displacement amounted to \$406 million (US) following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal, \$160 million after the 2017 earthquake in Mexico and \$130 million after Hurricane Ike in Cuba.

On account of no clear direction from the government to attend to their plights in the camps, some who have alternatives settled for going back to their home state – obviously South East. Since this exodus of internally displaced persons to the south east, the security situation in the zone has never been the same again. Social infrastructures have been stretched beyond imagination as well as social vices; hence the returnees arrived with nothing in their hands to sustain their livelihoods. Many have taken to survival instincts opting for the area of least resistance (making quick money) – resort to armed robbery, kidnapping, abduction, rape on individual group basis. Others took more dangerous steps further by joining their kiths and kins already enlisted into pro-self-determination organisations such as the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Eastern Security Networks (ESN), Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) members etc. This contemporary study is a backlash of “uncamped” internally displaced persons fleeing insurgency in the northern Nigeria and its correlation to fuelling insecurity and violence in the south east region, Nigeria.

Statement of the Problems

The incessant conflicts, violence, and insecurity in Nigeria have given rise to a significant humanitarian crisis marked by the internal displacement of millions of citizens. These Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are forced to flee their homes in search of safety, leaving behind their livelihoods and communities. This study delves into the multifaceted challenges posed by this internal displacement, with a particular focus on the North East region, which has been severely affected by Boko Haram insurgency, communal conflicts, farmer-herder clashes, and banditry.

One of the key issues of concern is the sheer magnitude of internal displacement in Nigeria. The nation is home to one of the largest populations of IDPs in Africa, with millions of individuals and families uprooted from their homes due to ongoing conflicts. Understanding the scale of this displacement is crucial for developing effective strategies to address the needs of these vulnerable populations.

Another critical aspect examined is the myriad of challenges faced by IDPs. These challenges encompass a wide range of issues, including access to basic services such as healthcare, education, clean water, and shelter. Furthermore, IDPs often grapple with limited livelihood opportunities, heightened security risks, and the psychological trauma associated with displacement.

The study also scrutinizes the response of the Nigerian government to the IDP crisis. While efforts have been made to establish IDP camps and provide humanitarian aid, questions linger regarding the effectiveness of government rehabilitation and resettlement plans. Are these initiatives adequate in addressing the long-term needs of IDPs, or are there gaps that need urgent attention?

Moreover, this research investigates the consequences of displacement on both IDPs and host communities. Displacement disrupts the social fabric, economic activities, and security dynamics of host communities, which may

lead to tensions and conflicts. Additionally, the loss of livelihoods and economic opportunities among IDPs may drive some individuals towards criminal activities or radicalization, thereby exacerbating security challenges.

Lastly, the study explores the intricate connection between displacement and insecurity, particularly in the South East region of Nigeria. It analyses how the influx of IDPs into this region has influenced its security landscape. Some IDPs, facing dire economic prospects, may resort to criminal activities, while others may become involved in self-determination organizations. Understanding this correlation is essential for devising strategies to mitigate potential security risks.

In summary, this study aims to comprehensively examine the complex issues surrounding internal displacement in Nigeria, shedding light on its humanitarian, socio-economic, and security dimensions. By doing so, it seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of the challenges faced by IDPs and the implications for Nigeria's overall stability and well-being.

Objectives of the Study

The main objectives of the study is on backlash of “Uncamped” internally displaced persons fleeing insurgency in the northern Nigeria and its correlation to fuelling insecurity and violence in the south east region, Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study are:

- i. To assess the impact of internal displacement resulting from conflicts, including Boko Haram insurgency, communal conflicts, and clashes between farmers and Fulani herdsmen, on the lives and livelihoods of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria.
- ii. To examine the challenges faced by both the government and IDPs in providing and accessing adequate support, social welfare, and livelihood opportunities, particularly for those residing outside of government-recognized IDP camps.
- iii. To analyze the consequences of the return of internally displaced persons, specifically to the South East region of Nigeria, on the region's security landscape, social infrastructure, and the potential rise in social vices and militant activities, including their association with self-determination organizations.

Conceptual and Theoretical Underpinnings

Internally Displaced Persons

Insecurity is not new to Nigeria, at each point the nation is faced with one form of insecurity or the other. If not religious violence up in the north, it will be militancy in the Niger Delta or political clash in South West or separatists experiments in the south east. Almost every state and geopolitical zones in Nigeria have experienced some levels of insecurity. However, none of them have been so challenging for Nigeria to overcome as Boko Haram, - not even the Nigerian Civil War. Unlike other forms of insecurity in Nigeria, the cause and agitation of the Boko Haram sect is unclear and confusing. Starting out as an “anti-western education” group, the group has metamorphosed into various phases difficult to decipher. The *modus operandi* of attack is rather confusing. From attack on former Emir of Kano to multiple attacks on Muslims - praying in mosques, to churches, market men and women, IDP camps and so on. On one fell swoop on 11th September 2015, 58 people were killed and 78 others injured after suicide bombers detonated explosives at the IDPs camp in Dikwa, Borno State, killing 78 persons, bombing at Maikohi camp, killed 7 and left 20 injured, 30th October 2016, reported a suicide bomber was shot dead while sneaking into IDPs camp in Borno etc. All of these mentioned incidents pushed several thousands of internally displaced persons from their homes and places of doing businesses. Many fled in different directions, some to government created IDP camps, others to relations living several miles away while others who considered it better to return to their homelands moved – on a journey of “God knows where”

Ocha (2003) described internally displaced persons IDP as persons or groups of persons who because of armed conflict, systematic violations of human rights, internal strife, or natural or man-made disasters have been forced to flee their homes or places of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly, to another location but have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Ladan in his own view saw Internally Displaced Persons under

international law are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obligated to flee or to have cause to leave their homes or place of habitual residence in particular, due to or in order to stave off the effect of armed conflict, violations of human rights, situations of generalized violence, natural or manmade disasters, to another place considered relatively safe either within their own national borders (as internally displaced persons) or travel across an internationally recognized state border (as refugees) (Ladan, 2006). Internally Displaced persons are mostly victims of the brutality of man against man, various kind of injustices or violent confrontations, perpetrated either by their own government against them or by others. The displaced persons, who have crossed an international border, are considered as refugees. Robinson (2003) expanded the definitional scope of IDP to include those displaced by development projects. The expansive definition by Robinson marks a great stride so as to capture a near all and inclusive concept of internally displaced persons especially in the developing world such as ours. However, in Nigeria and many other developing countries the views of Robinson at best merely satisfy the appetite of intellectualism, hence the focus of attention of international aid institutions and agencies revolve round those displaced by disaster than for victims of development. Humanity has paid dearly for this great omission as the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions and the Social and Economic Right Action Centre in 2008 suggested that over 2 million people were forcibly evicted from their homes between 2000 and 2007 in cities such as Abuja, Port Harcourt and Lagos following government urban maintenance and or renewal programs. For the fact that IDPs (for development reasons) through strict definition and application of global principles on IDP, they become the proverbial bat that cannot be categorized as birds (for their teeth) nor other animals (that they fly) – thereby worsening an already precarious quagmire. However, according to Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2016), 15 million persons are internally displaced by developmental projects yearly worldwide. For instance, in the 1980s, well over 26, 000, individuals were displaced internally in order to create way for the Dadin Kowa dam along Gongola River in Nigeria. In 2015, over 10,000 citizens in Lagos state were evicted from Badia east community. This is to create way for Lagos metropolitan development and government projects with-out compensating and resettling those displaced. Ibáñez and Moya (2007) opined that the fact that they are displaced from their homes exposes them to a situation of vulnerability to poverty and human right abuses and should entitle them to the accruals of their new status. In Nigeria, for the reason that the predicaments of displacement does not discriminate on the hardship it comes with, we shall explore all the internal displacement factors that have combined to destabilize an already bad economy, escalating violence insecurity situation.

Reasons for Displacement in Nigeria

Armed conflict between states and non-state actors; insurgency, violence, climate change, natural disasters, ethno-religious, herders/farmers clashes, communal clashes, and developmental projects are general reasons for internal displacement in Nigeria (Adamu and Rasheed, 2021). Some of the displacement causes will be discussed.

I. Insurgency

Insurgency is the main cause of internal displacement in Nigeria in the last three decades. The United Nation's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, observed that Boko Haram's renewed attacks in 2009, caused more than twenty thousand people have lost their lives, countless man and women abducted, economic disruption, loss of property etc. Boko Haram terrorist group took over many towns and villages in the North East, declaring it "sovereign state" (Hassan, 2016). Oriakhi and Osemwengie, (2012), observed that assaults by insurgency in Nigeria has caused destruction of properties amounting to billions of naira, loss of lives, income loss, loss and damage to investments and infrastructure respectively. UNOCHA reported that up to 2.5 million persons have absconded from their places of residence, while over 2 million are internally displaced and about 200 thousand have gone to neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon as immigrants (Theresa, Okoli, & Uroko, 2017) posits that over 3 million persons are internally displaced in Nigeria out of which about 900 thousand are from north east. The population represent 10 percent and 3rd of the internally displaced persons in the world behind Syria with 6.5 million, Colombia 5.7 million and accounts for the largest population of conflict induced IDPs in Africa (Hansen, 2016). In 2015, about thirty million persons were displaced internally and when translated it means sixty-six thousand people were displaced on a daily basis. Odusanya (2016), disaggregated the causal for internal displacement, blaming terrorism and insurgency as the two most notorious of them hence his views that the reasons for internal displacement is often as a result of terrorism, insurgency, genocide, wars, persecution and political instability.

II. Communal Clashes

The horrendous killings by the Hausa-Fulani Herdsmen ravaging some states in the North and the Middle belt regions greatly contribute to internal displacement in Nigeria. When the Hausa – Fulani herdsman/Farmers clash debuted, internal displacement in Nigeria rose exponentially accounting for the ranking of Nigeria to the position of the 3rd most terrorized country in the world (Ludovica, 2015) They are believed to have taken the lives of over one thousand persons in 2014 alone (Ludovica, 2015), and over seven hundred killed in the first quarter of 2015. Herdsmen attack in Southern Kaduna left a lot of people killed and many displaced (Theresa; Okoli & Uroko, 2017) and the attack has been recurring and seems intractable for several years now. Moses (2016), cited in Theresa; Okoli; and Uroko, (2017), stated that on the eve of Christmas, 2016, Fulani herdsmen attacked Goska in Southern Kaduna burning, maiming and killing innocent Nigerians. It was only the lucky ones that could flee in different directions to tell the story.

III. Natural Disasters

Natural disasters that precipitate internal displacements of persons include desertification, flooding, erosion etc. Sometime in 2004; the overflow of River Niger along its banks in Nigeria caused widespread destruction of lives and property including the displacement of thousands of IDPs in States like Kogi, Anambra, Delta, Bayelsa, Rivers. States in the South East and South South regions state experienced erosion and spilling of crude oil respectively of various magnitude as (Moses 2016 cited in Theresa; Okoli & Uroko, 2017) stated. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), on September 17th 2018 declared national disaster in the states of Kogi, Anambra, Katsina, Kaduna and Delta (Sanni, 2018), leading to the displacement of thousands and death of over 100 people. Earlier in January 2015, NEMA reported the displacement of over sixty thousand people by natural disaster in Nigeria alone. Oil exploration causes enormous environmental damage which causes displacement of persons of various size and degrees, hence the loss of life and unbearable challenges to those living in the affected areas mostly in the Niger Delta. The Ogoni people readily come to mind. Over 2000 people from Ogoni land have been forced to flee their homes; seeking refuge in neighbouring states (Ezeanokwasa, Kalu & Okaphor, 2018, p. 15). At various times, the unbearable displacement situations led to protests over environmental degradation against Shell and other oil prospecting Companies in their land. In the 1993 protest alone, about 27 villages were raided as a result of the protest, leading to the death of over 2000 persons while 80,000- 100,000 were displaced. However, natural displacement can be transitory displacement while permanent or temporary displacement can be as a result of progressive resource dilapidation.

IV. Developmental Projects

Execution of developmental projects is another cause of internal displacement of persons due to forceful evacuation, movement of people, removal, or uprooting of communities from their habitual residence to pave way infrastructural development. Such infrastructural developmental includes construction of roads, railways, dams, hydroelectric power projects, mining, extraction of natural resources, agricultural investment and so on. Per Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2016), 15 million persons are internally displaced by developmental projects yearly worldwide. In Nigeria, in the 1980s, about 26,000 persons were displaced internally in other to pave way for the construction of the Dadin Kowa dam along Gongola River in Nigeria. Other fast developing cities in Nigeria like Lagos have witnessed some astonishing incidences of displacement. In 2015 for an example, over 10,000 citizens in Lagos state were evicted from Badia East Community for the reason of the Lagos Metropolitan Development and other governmental development projects with-out compensating and resettling of those displaced.

V. Ethno-Religious Clashes

In Nigeria there are over 250 ethnic groups with no cultural homogeneity whatsoever. The three major tribes of Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa located in the east, west and north respectively have different religion ascribed to them. The two most prominent alien religions in Nigeria – Islam and Christianity have both exacerbated an obvious polarized dissimilarity in the way adherents perceive themselves and the value they have for each other. This phenomenon has bred intolerance and clashes between them, leading to violent arms struggle that has occasioned violence of varying degree and intensity engendering displacement of persons. While Muslims are predominantly found between the Fulani-Hausa in the North, Christians are more in the Middle Belt and Southern part of the country (Ahmad, 2018). Since the politically colored enactment of Sharia laws in the twelve northern states in the year 2000, there has been an escalation in violence and conflicts among them. Other time line of ethno-religious

conflicts in Nigeria includes the following; the Tiv and Jukun in October 2001, clash between the Yoruba's and Hausas in 2002, Kafanchan-Kaduna conflict 1980s and 1990s and still ongoing, the Kaduna Sharia riots of 2000, the Jos riots of 2001 all have caused catastrophic displacement of persons in disaggregated values. (Ezeanokwasa; Kalu and Okaphor, 2018), (Canci & Odukoya, 2016).

Some scholars have observed that the politicization of ethnicity and religion in Nigeria has been responsible for the creation of groups such as the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Movement for the Survival of the Izon Nationality of the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), Niger Delta Resistant Movement (NDRM), Igbo People's Congress (IPC), the Nigerian or Yobe Taliban, Arewa People's Congress (APC), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Oduduwa People's Congress (OPC),. The actions of these groups at one point or the other have been responsible in the increasing the figures of IDPs in the country (Bamidele, 2012). The groups' action and the consequent government reactions to quell them are all in themselves precursors to internal displacement.

Theoretical Framework

Social Learning Theory

This theory was propounded Bandura (1977), who posits that most human behavior is learned observationally through modelling: from observing others, one forms an idea of how new behaviors are performed, and on later occasions this coded information serves as a guide for action." Behaviors and attitudes develop in response to reinforcement and encouragement from the people around us. Social learning theorists acknowledge that childhood experience is important; they also believe that the identity people acquire is formed more by the behaviors and attitudes of others, hence social learning theory explain deviance and crime. The theory considers the formation of one's identity to be a learned response to social stimuli and emphasizes the societal context of socialization rather than the individual mind, how children learn in social environments by observing and then imitating the behaviour of others. People engage in crime because of their association with others who engage in crime and criminal behavior is reinforced and they learn beliefs that are favorable to crime. Consequently, these individuals come to view crime as something that is desirable, or at least justifiable in certain situations. Learning criminal or deviant behavior is the same as learning to engage in conforming behavior: It is done through association with or exposure to others. In fact, association with delinquent friends is the best predictor of delinquent behavior other than prior delinquency. Social learning theory assumes that there are three mechanisms by which individuals learn to connect in crime: differential reinforcement, beliefs, and modelling. Differential reinforcement of crime means that individuals can teach others to engage in crime by reinforcing and punishing certain behaviors. Crime is more likely to take place when it; (i) is frequently reinforced and infrequently punished; (ii) Results in large amounts of reinforcement (such as money, social approval, or pleasure) and little punishment; and (iii) Is more likely to be reinforced than alternative behaviors. Studies prove that individuals who are reinforced for their crime are more likely to engage in successive crime, especially when they are in situations analogous to those that were previously reinforced. Studies on criminals suggest that values favouring crime fall into three categories. First is the approval of certain minor forms of crime, such as alcohol use and curfew violation for adolescents and gambling, "soft" drug use later. Secondly is the approval of or justification of certain forms of crime, including some serious ones. These people believe that crime is generally wrong, but that some criminal acts are justifiable or even desirable in certain situations. For instance, many people will say that fighting is wrong, however, that it is justified if the individual has been insulted or provoked. Thirdly, some people cling to certain general values that are more conducive to crime and make crime appear as a more attractive alternative to other behaviors. For example, individuals who have a large desire for excitement or thrills, those who have a disdain for hard work and a desire for quick and easy success, or those who wish to be seen as "tough" or "macho" might view crime from a more favourable perspective than others.

Insurgency and Displacement in Nigeria

Insurgency has become one of the dangerous threats to world order to the point that no country in the world can claim it is free from the violent acts of shooting, armed robbery, bombing, hostage taking, and kidnapping. Insurgency has become the greatest threat to world peace in recent times and it is felt globally (Olufemi & Olaide,

2015). Displacement and social dislocation happen to be the most disastrous consequence of insurgency on the political atmosphere known as Nigeria. However, Nigeria has its own share on the effects of this threat as it is also a challenge to national development and security. Insurgency in Nigeria has reached an unprecedented level where hundreds of thousands have lost their lives and property, while so many have been wounded or displaced from their places of habitual residence. This has resulted in the disruption and interruption of school's calendar, public utilities, social, economic, political, cultural activities as well as loss of billions of naira, businesses and properties destroyed (Abdulrahman and Zuwaira, 2016). Notwithstanding, the harmful consequences of insurgency on the wellbeing and economy, insurgence has destroyed educational institutions and has crippled economic activities in the country. Former President Olusegun Obasanjo, once espoused that billions of Naira lost to insurgency would have been used for developmental projects such as road constructions, improving medical care, rehabilitating the educational sector and providing overall services to the citizens of Nigeria (Letswa and Isyaku, 2018). Itumo and Nwefuru (2016) alluded to the fact of insurgency as precipitating internal displacement when he opined that ever since insurgency started in Nigeria, several persons have been made to leave their habitual place of residence from states like Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba, Borno, Yobe and Adamawa.

In 2014 alone, 140,000 persons were made homeless from communities, states and villages in northern part of Nigeria (Abdulrahman & Zuwaira, 2016). In 2015, there were reports that 70,000 Nigerians have left the country to nearby countries of Benin Republic, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. This shows that within Nigeria there are over 1,000 internally displaced persons from the north (Letswa & Isyaku, 2018). Mohammed (2017) observed that since insurgency became violent in 2009, it has led to over two million displacements of people within and across borders between neighbouring countries.

Salkida (2012) argued that since insurgency became more violent in 2010, the assaults by Boko Haram extremist group increased beyond the boundaries of Nigeria. The sects engage in bombing government institutions/facilities, schools, police stations, army formations/barracks, Churches, and Mosques, IDP Camps etc. They were also involved in kidnapping women, children, and the kidnapped of more than two hundred and fifty school girls in Chibok town in Borno state rattled the world like non else – prompting the “#Bring back Our Girls” movement. Former First Lady of USA, Michelle Obama was to join the movement. Regrettably, the movement was later so politicized and little was achieved as more than the girls are still in captivity. By 2011 the country was said to have lost about two thousand lives to Boko Haram (Salkida, 2012). The government-declared war on terrorists and its escalation in 2012 and 2013 led to a state of emergency been declared in Yobe, Adamawa and Borno states. Telephone services were later cut off in the affected states in an attempt to prosecute harder counterinsurgency operations by the Joint Task Force (JTF). Despite, these COIN operations, Boko Haram continued to unleash mayhem on innocent citizens. The outcome of this according to Adamu and Rasheed (2016) brought about millions of IDPs in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria who fled their homes for safety. Boko Haram violence has caused massive displacement in Nigeria and according to Abdulazeez (2016), as of October 2015, insurgency was accountable for the displacement of about two million people in Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states alone.

About 12.5 million people are displaced in the 21 Sub Saharan countries and Nigeria has the largest share in the continent of Africa with over four million as a result of violent conflict (Abdulazeez, 2016; Mohammed, 2017). Nigeria happens to be the third in the world IDP ranking - following Colombia and Syria and the 2/3 of the IDPs in Nigeria is as a result of Boko Haram, amounting to 91.98 percent while communal clashes represent 7.95 percent and natural disaster with 0.6 percent (Mohammed, 2017).

According to IDMC (2017) account, the attacks by insurgency and military actions against the sect continued to result to the bulk of IDPs in 2017 as there were attacks in displacement camps and counter insurgency actions by the Nigerian military and the Joint Task Force from Chad, Niger, Benin and Cameroon also increased, to a total of 279,000 (Marama, 2018). According to Marama (2018), Boko Haram killed 13 persons in Borno state IDPs camp on the 2nd of October 2018 leading to people fleeing from their camps locating other places for safety. As at 2017 a total number of 1,707,000 persons were living as displaced persons in the country (Marama, 2018).

Implications of Internal Displacement

Internal displacement has sociological, economic, cultural and political implications for the displaced persons, the host communities and to the society in general. *The crisis of displacement has become a global phenomenon that deserves global attention to which institutions and agencies are making concerted efforts to address. How far or how well such effort have impacted or mitigated on the situation remains a far cry that demands intensification of intervention strategies. Nigeria has witnessed series of insecurity crisis leading to displacement of persons, destruction of lives and property with its negative impact on the IDPs and the society in general (Adamu & Rasheed, 2021).*

For many years, South-East Nigeria was considered the **safest geopolitical zone** in the country. The five states — Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo — that form the zone had recorded the least spate of violent attacks in comparison with other parts of the country. **For instance, Nigeria Mourns in its 2019 report, said** the South-East recorded the least number of reported killings with 94 deaths, while the South-West recorded 157 deaths, followed by South-South with - 341 deaths. North-Central - 469 deaths North-East - 1009 while North-West had the highest with 1,118 deaths. Noting further, it stated that it didn't take long before things went for the worst. For instance, the escalation jumped in a jiffy such that Imo state recorded the highest fatalities with 208 deaths, representing 32.7 percent of the total figure within one year, followed by Anambra - 187 deaths, Ebonyi - 103 deaths, followed by Abia - 70 deaths, and Enugu - 68 deaths. The appalling steady deterioration in security challenges and escalation of fatalities in south east region per the data obtained showed 636 deaths were recorded in reported violent attacks between December 13, 2020, and December 12, 2021 representing more than 500% increase. According to the SBM Intelligence report, the 2,085 reported deaths mean Nigeria experienced a 47 per cent increase in media reported killings, from 7063 fatalities in 2020 to 10,366 in 2021. Of the 10,366 casualties of violent deaths last year, Kaduna State alone recorded 1, 192 at the hands of bandits. Furthermore, Sahara Reporters per Beacon revealed that no fewer than 8372 people lost their lives to security challenges in Nigeria in 2021. The firm stated that the larger share of these deaths was recorded in the North. The report stated, "An analysis of the fatalities for January 1 to December 31, 2021, shows that we recorded a total of 8372 fatalities across the country. A breakdown of these fatalities according to the geopolitical regions shows that the North West suffered the highest with 3051 deaths, followed by the North-East with 1895 casualties, North-Central 1684 victims, South-East 853, South-South 448 and South-West 441. The North remains the flashpoint for fatalities as North West had 36.4%, North-East 22.6% and North-Central.20.1% putting the total percentage of fatalities for Northern Nigeria at 79.2%. This is a clear indicator that there seems to be no letting up in insecurity and violence in the north. The correlation to the indices shows that the people who fled the North would never expect to return in any time soon. The report further revealed that Beacon also said that in December 2021 it observed, "Social upheaval especially in northern communities protesting against the perceived deterioration in the security situation, and that a major bandit leader in North-West expresses his willingness to demobilize but gives conditions. Government's strategy to contain the escalation seems unclear as it insists that it is not ready to negotiate with the bandits and insurgents. This strategy of government casts serious cloud over the next way follows by the suffocating internally displaced persons whose conditions of living has continued to deteriorate to a choking level.

As a result of these emerging challenges facing Nigeria and the continent of Africa, African leaders at the Kampala Convention, in 2009, drew encouragement from the United Nations Convention on Policies Guiding Internally Displaced Persons. One of the guiding principles emphasized at the Convention was that it is the duty of States to be responsible in assisting and protecting IDPs within their territory (Ekpa & Dahlan, 2016). This informed the basis why Nigeria formulated the National Policy on IDPs in 2012 as a framework geared towards responding to the human rights needs of internally displaced persons (Ezeanokwasa, Okafor & Kalu, 2018) even though the national policy is yet to be incorporated into our domestic laws. This noble stride birthed the Nigeria's government Responsibility to Protect (R2P) the Internally Displaced Persons IDPs.

The concept of R2P represents a political obligation that was recognized by different countries who avowed their commitment at the UN in 2005 Global Summit to tackle its four key concerns to halt crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, genocide, and war crimes (Arbour, 2008). The concept of R2P became a top priority in the United Nations when crimes against humanity occurred in countries like Rwanda and Yugoslavia. A duty was placed on the United

Nations by this concept to intervene by virtue of R2P to protect the citizens from massive killings by not considering the previous all hallowed state sovereignty principles when issues are spiraling out of hand or there is manifest issue of serious crimes against humanity. R2P is integrated here to refer to the government's Responsibility to Protect (IDPs in Nigeria). Nigeria being a signatory to the duo of the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) agreement on protecting citizens against crimes against humanity has the exclusive Responsibility to Protect (R2P) internally displaced persons within its territory by providing the basic needs and protecting its citizens hence their lives, homes and properties have been lost, access to quality life also lost as a result of unending security challenges caused by no fault of theirs.

Often times, contemporary literature on IDPs focus on the elderly, children and women population - otherwise known as the 'vulnerable groups' with no substantial priority been placed on studying the challenges of displacement on youths and men. The general aphorism that "men are strong and able" to take care of themselves in any situation is not to be regarded as sacrosanct in this situation. The plight of the men population of IDPs has also been known to suffer grave consequences as victims of conflicts and instances are abounding to validate this point. Robbery, child-soldiers, drug-addiction, post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD), mental illnesses, loss of jobs and other forms of insecurity, are challenges that internally displaced youths and men grapple with (Ezeanokwasa, Okaphor & Kalu, 2018). It is on this note that the need to investigate the challenges of the youth/men IDPs in Nigeria arose to fill this major gap in literature on the challenges IDPs men faced in Nigeria, using the Durumi Area One Camp in Abuja, FCT to consider how the government in Nigeria has upheld its R2P IDPs, especially the men category. (Oghuvbu & Okolie, 2000)

The global cost of internal displacement in 2020 was estimated, which includes the cost of providing displaced people with support for their housing, education, health and security loss of income. The consistent limited data available on the financial costs and losses linked with internal displacement points to the fact that this figure is likely to be a huge underestimate. Faced with this obvious challenge, IDMC embarked on collecting data on the economic impacts of internal displacement in specific situations including Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia and Columbia. The project turned out to be a huge success. New data now emerged highlighting specific consequences for IDPs and host communities which comprised of women, men, boys and girls, and people from different minority groups, for more inclusive and tailored support. With better information on the economic impacts of past, present and future internal displacement conditions, governments and partners can now plan more effectively. Uncovering the hidden cost of internal displacement demonstrates the burden this ever-growing phenomenon places on sustainable development, and makes the case for increased investments in prevention and durable solutions.

Socioeconomic Conditions

Internal displacement poses a huge socioeconomic implication to the lives of people forced to leave their home because of conflict, violence, climate change or disasters, in many ways. Their housing, access to infrastructure, education, health, social life, security and environment change and often degrade. Displaced people often lose their livelihoods, as a result of being pushed away from their work place or source of income. Some experience months or years without any means to make a decent living. Displaced Persons fleeing their homes often times assume that they would return home sooner than later, resulting in their taking only a few things with them. Indeed, many never did go back as expected, prompting loss of quite a number of belongings and dependence only on help from friends.

Beyond the losses caused by a disaster's destructive force, less direct consequences can also impact the economy and one is the inability of people displaced to continue their habitual work. By disconnecting from their productive activity for days, weeks, months or even years, internal displacement reduces economic production. It can also damage their social life and impact their mental health and wellbeing. IDMC studies have estimated internal displacements triggered by specific events in Nepal, Mexico and Cuba cost the three countries hundreds of millions of dollars. In an analysis of the economic impacts of internal displacement in eight countries, loss of livelihood was found to be the main financial burden, close to health and housing costs and far ahead of security and education costs. These findings are concerning, because they are underestimates. They consider only the most direct consequences of internal displacement on the income of displaced people when they are unable to continue their

previous activity. They do not take into account impacts on the host community or on the broader production system of the affected area.

It is the responsibility of the national government to protect and assist internally displaced persons so long as they remain within the borders of IDPs country. The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement which most states and the global community consented to acknowledged it as a global principle, according to Mooney (2005) protecting IDPs is the core responsibility of own state government in the implementation, organization, initiation, coordination of humanitarian assistance, protection against any form of inhuman treatment within its territory and not the duty of a foreign government or other humanitarian organisation or agencies.

In some circumstances, poor socioeconomic conditions (e.g., impoverishment, unemployment, lack of access to services and infrastructure, over-crowded living conditions) may make it more likely for IDPs to become radicalised. Lischer (2005) finds instead that there is generally little evidence to support the connection between particular socioeconomic conditions and IDPs violence. However, drawing on a case study of camps in Dadaab, Kenya, for Somali IDPs, Martin-Rayo (2013) finds that good quality education is a key factor in countering the risk of radicalisation. A study on Gulu town, Uganda, finds that continued close connections of IDPs with their families and those they lived with before displacement resulted in internal social regulation and lack of resort to violence among Gulu's displaced population.

Impact on Host Communities

Displaced persons have the potential to destabilise host communities in various ways, including directly - participating in attacks; indirectly - changing the demographic (ethnic or sectarian) composition of host communities; and indirectly by imposing a heavy economic and social burden on local communities (e.g., driving up rents; competing for employment; and drawing on limited social services) (Lischer, 2003). These conditions can produce resentment among local host populations and could, beside extreme IDPs deprivation, create the background for future clashes and conflict. Negative perceptions of IDPs can also result in harsh constraints placed on these populations. Mistreatment of IDPs can become a grievance against which IDP communities unite.

Protracted Situations

If IDP crises become protracted, there is a greater probability that refugees/displaced persons will become involved in political violence and be susceptible to militant recruitment (Olukolajo, 2014). Overtime, IDPs can develop into a highly organised and militant states-in-exile. In addition, protracted situations result in reduced expectations for the future, increasing feelings of hopelessness, and desperation among refugees/displaced person. Further, host societies are likely to become less hospitable the longer the IDP crisis lasts.

Living Conditions and Employment

Most IDP crises occur in the poorest regions of the world, with immense material hardship experienced by IDPs (Holzer 2012). Some scholars argue that poor socioeconomic conditions can make it more likely for IDPs to become radicalised. Hutson, Long & Page (2009) find that some Palestinian IDPs living in poverty-stricken camps with minimal opportunities have exhibited an attraction to radical Islam, which has not occurred among the better-integrated Palestinian community living outside the camps. Hanafi and Long (2010) argue that the negative effects of confinement and overcrowding in these camps, including feelings of despair, are likely to lead to chaos. In the case of Iraqi IDPs, Leenders (2012) states that extreme deprivation (impoverishment, lack of access to education, and limited employment opportunities) fuels grievances, particularly among youths and men. This, combined with growing resentment within some host communities could trigger future clashes and conflict, possibly of a sectarian nature. Within Iraq, the displacement of Iraqis is occurring in a context of high unemployment, decreased access to basic food rations, clean water, sanitation and electricity. Ferris (2008) claims that although there is no evidence that IDPs are being recruited into militias in a greater proportion than other Iraqis, the greater likelihood of IDPs being unemployed than those not displaced makes them particularly vulnerable. In order to counter this vulnerability and security risk, she calls for sufficient humanitarian assistance to ensure that IDPs have livelihoods and access to

education and health services. Lischer (2008) also emphasises that in the case of Iraq, where IDPs are mainly concerned about food, shelter, health care and education, humanitarian assistance plays an essential role in minimising the influence of militant groups on displaced persons and pacifying anxious host states. Allen (2010) observes that Somali IDPs, living in very poor conditions in camps and facing high rates of crime and violence, were not themselves inclined to organise into armed groups. As a matter of facts, better conditions of living and employment opportunities remain a very vital point if radicalisation and propensity to violence and insecurity among the internally displaced persons is a priority to tackle.

Education

In contradistinction to other factors above with correlation to radicalisation and militancy among IDPs, education seems to have a rather contentious point here. Martin-Rayó (2013) finds that poverty, lack of employment opportunities and the presence of idle youth have not resulted in radicalisation and terrorist recruitment of IDPs. He considers good quality education to be a key factor in countering the risk of radicalisation. Those who have received even a little education are more inclined to view violence negatively and to be less susceptible to ideological brainwashing by extremist groups. He compares their situation to that of Somalis who experience institutionalised discrimination in education. Some of these students, who expressed a sense of desperation, openly identified their desire to join Al-Qaeda upon graduation. Martin-Rayó (2013) concludes that a well-rounded education, even if for short duration, is a key factor in reducing radicalisation of displaced populations and that the international community should develop protocols for education in camps alongside established protocols for food, clothing and shelter.

Social Ties

A study on displaced populations in Gulu Town, Uganda, attributes the relative stability of the town – despite the massive influx of uprooted rural Acholi people – in part to social ties. The displaced were often tightly connected to their families and those they lived with before displacement, resulting in considerable internal social regulation among Gulu's displaced population (Branch, 2013). Over time, however, the new generation of displaced comprised of those who are poor and had lost their family and social ties introduced a new perspective. This new dynamic contributed to a rise in tensions that could in turn increase urban violence or provide a recruitment ground for government militias or rebels (Branch, 2013).

Political factors: Voice and Grievance Resolution Mechanisms

Expression of IDP voices is considered an important grievance resolution mechanism and lack of outlets for it or their exclusion from political processes may encourage violence. There has been a growing critique in recent years of the way in which humanitarian and aid agencies purport to speak on behalf of IDPs refugees and their tendency to present IDPs solely as helpless and lost. This may be seen as the only way in which the displaced can be heard and must be encouraged as much as possible. In addition, the lack of effective grievance resolution mechanisms can result in misclassification of ordinary political engagement as radicalisation (Lischer, 2005) This has resulted in the silencing of IDPs voices and their exclusion from the design and implementation of interventions aimed at IDPs communities (often undermining efficient and dignified programming) (see Hanafi and Long, 2010). In addition, they have been left out of political processes – creating a situation of superiority and inferiority complexes. The interplay of voice and grievance resolution mechanism is perhaps issue, political or cultural related. While Palestinian IDPs particularly the youth, have been critical of having no voice in the legal formulation of their status and say in political processes that affect them (Hanafi and Long, 2010), in the case of Rwandan Hutu IDPs, Perera (2013) finds that their exclusion from access to conventional political power/local governance structures has strengthened their conviction that they need to remain armed to survive. In the case of Darfur, IDPs have regularly expressed concerns over the lack of access to the political process. Kahn (2008) argues that the principle that camps are neutral spaces should not result in them being strictly apolitical; rather the failure to allow for the peaceful expression of political views may encourage violence as this may be seen as the only way in which those displaced can be heard. Further, the lack of effective grievance resolution mechanisms and outlets to articulate different viewpoints – and the failure of humanitarian actors to institutionalise such practices – can result in the misclassification of ordinary political

engagement for radicalisation. Acts that could otherwise be considered civic debate are seen as a social problem (Lebson 2013). This in turn can result in problematic repression of such engagement. Holzer in a case study on a Liberian IDP camps, points to inadequate grievance practices as a key factor behind the classification of social protests as ‘criminal acts’ and subsequent police crackdowns Holzer (2012). Between 2007 and 2008, a group called IDPs Women with IDPs Concerns engaged in social protests (including a food boycott) to push for better migration choices. Practitioners and policymakers need to view IDPs as actors who take independent political action. This, Lebson (2013) argues could result in a reconsideration of policies that seek to deter political activity in camps, instead aim to establish alternative opportunities for voice, such as town hall meetings in camps, communities/IDP forum, refugee-run media, polling and traditional forms of political engagement unique to each group.

Government Responses to Plights of IDPs

Establishment of Institutional Framework to Handle IDPs

The initial, challenge encountered by Nigerian state in managing the plight of IDPs was the absence of legal institutional framework responsible for providing short-, medium- and long-term measures for their plights. In the absence of a legal framework or institution, provision of assistance, protection, reintegration and resettlement for IDPs is mostly to be chaotic and undertaken by agencies of government on an ad hoc and reactive basis. Generally, the ideal situation is that government should be proactive rather than reactive in matters concerning her citizenry. In order to address this gap and ameliorate the plights of the IDPs, the Federal Government of Nigeria set up a committee to draft a National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The committee was to assist in registration, issuance of identity cards, prevention or reduction in instances of internal displacement, allocation of responsibilities to agencies/organs of government, non-governmental and civil society organizations. The committee’s work culminated in a National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons which was prepared and presented to government in 2011 but it is yet to be officially adopted.

The National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons

Nigeria developing a National Policy for Internally Displaced Persons was first considered by the “National Commission for Refugees”, who ipso facto was the management agency catering for the then scarcely and sparsely IDPs in Nigeria in 2003. A Presidential Committee was given a draft of the document to further expand into a more comprehensive ‘National Policy’. The Presidential Committee was given the responsibility of developing a framework that will improve the prevention of IDPs, recommend best ways IDPs can be managed as well as protecting their human rights and the need to alleviate their sufferings once displacement occurs (Akanmu, Ogunsesan, Omotosho & Adejare, 2016). The policy outlines responsibilities and roles for Local, State and Federal Governments, non - governmental organizations, IDPs camp host communities, civil society groups, community-based organizations, humanitarian actors both nationally, internationally and the general public (Akanmu, Ogunsesan, Omotosho & Adejare, 2016). The policy also was to educate the populace on their obligations and rights before, during and after displacement. The NCFR with permission of the Office of the Attorney General of The Federation drafted a Bill and submitted the original draft to the Federal Executive Council (FEC) in October 2010. Different stakeholders, comprising of the Technical Working Group (TWG) was established to work on the Councils instruction, adjust the Policy and aligns it with the provisions of the African Union Convention for the Assistance and Protection of Internally Displaced persons in Africa to which Nigeria signed and ratified. Technical Working Group was supported by international and national technical experts. The recommendations by Technical Working Group were geared towards saving lives, wanton destruction of property, engendering national unity, preventing large scale displacements, socio-economic and promoting human development as well as protecting the rights of all peoples (Carr, 2009).

The draft National Policy aims to guide the different branches of government, donors and humanitarian agencies in preventing displacement and in providing protection and assistance to those displaced. It also allocates responsibilities to the appropriate government bodies for different aspects on the short, medium and long-term response to internal displacement, with the existing National Commission for Refugees (NCFR) as the governmental focal agency previously charged with the responsibility for coordinating the activities of all agencies, including

international humanitarian agencies. Furthermore, it empowers the National Emergency Management Agency, the Human Rights Commission and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution to partner with the NCFR to support the activities of the States and Local Governments in implementing the Policy within their respective spheres of activities. The Policy starts by re-affirming the fundamental rights of all citizens under the 1999 Constitution but also acknowledges the particular vulnerabilities of women and children, according them special guarantees. It then includes measures to protect against being displaced and sets out standards; pertaining to the delivery of humanitarian assistance by national and international humanitarian agencies. To this end, the Policy envisages the application of various laws and institutions to the protection of IDPs under what it terms a 'humanitarian framework of cooperation' of all relevant Ministries, States, Local Governments, Departments and Agencies as well as international organisations and charitable institutions.

The Policy also identifies some circumstances under which a person ceases to be an IDP (Bukar, 2011) and goes on to outline in general terms national and international legal principles applicable to IDPs. These principles are reflections of fundamental rights of individuals as guaranteed under the Constitution and under international instruments, including freedom from discrimination, freedom of movement, freedom of association, and the rights to dignity and family life. While the Policy guarantees the protection of the above mentioned rights, it at the same time prohibits acts that are capable of causing internal displacement such as ethnic cleansing or large-scale development projects not justified by public interest. It further outlines strategies for the prevention and management of conflicts including the involvement of communities and ethnic groups in the economic, political and social activities of the government, promotes dialogue, consultation, inter-ethnic marriages, religious harmony through interfaith relations, education and a fair and equitable distribution of economic resources among the people and communities.

Where, however, displacement becomes inevitable, all the rights of citizens equally accrue to IDPs. The NCFR is enjoined to create an ambient atmosphere for their return, resettlement or reintegration. In planning for return, resettlement or reintegration, the Commission is equally enjoined to ensure participation of the IDPs through their chosen representatives. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in Chapter II declares that the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government; accordingly, government at all levels and its agencies are the first referral point in the implementation machinery of the Policy. Adopting this policy however suffered serious delays, the implication of which denied Nigeria some opportunities which the country would have had access to if the Policy were to be in place. While the policy was regrettably tucked away inside one of the shelves of one of the Federal Ministries in Abuja, displacement due to Bandits, Fulani Herders, Boko Haram etc was on the increase (Maidoh & Makolo, 2017).

Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is to the effect that States have the primary responsibility to protect the people within their territories, but should they fail, the international community has a responsibility to act to prevent or stop gross violation of fundamental rights. In October 2005, world leaders unanimously adopted the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) principle in paragraphs 138–140 of the UN World Summit Outcome Document. In April 2006, United Nations Security Council reaffirmed the principle in Resolution 1674. The principle has also become part of the working language of international engagement with political crises such as in the African Union/United Nations and the diplomatic efforts to resolve the post-election conflict in Kenya among other frontline nations. Going by the United Nations definition of the principle, it circumscribed it to the four main triggers of displacement of persons viz; crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and war crimes with member nations reiterating that R2P stands on three pillars viz;

Firstly, that each state is to use appropriate and necessary means to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement.

Secondly, it calls on the international community to provide assistance and capacity building to States that are under stress and unable to protect their civilian population from mass atrocity crimes and

Thirdly, that the international responsibility is to respond through the United Nations in a timely and decisive manner when national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their population.

The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon identified translating the R2P from words to actions as one of his main priorities and during August 2007 appointed Dr. Edward Luck as his first Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. Working closely with the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, the two Special Advisers and their Joint Office have helped advance R2P within the UN system to further the political, institutional and operational development of the responsibility to protect principle, as set out by the General Assembly in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document,” In July 2013 the Secretary-General appointed Dr. Jennifer Welsh as his second Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, who was followed by Ivan Simonovic during October 2016 and Dr. Karen Smith during January 2019. During Mr. Ivan Šimonovic as special adviser on the responsibility to protect, Mr. Ki – Moon stated thus;

“That all have a role to play in defusing potentially catastrophic situation from happening”.

By extension, the R2P applies to Protecting Displaced Persons. Protecting Displaced Persons in itself is a legal theory that is essentially focused on developing a national legal frame-work geared towards upholding the tenet that rights of displaced persons is a major national responsibility. United Nations resolution has encouraged states with IDPs to strengthen and develop strong national legal frameworks that will facilitate maximum. Nations, including Peru, Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Georgia, and Colombia, have taken bold steps in this direction either by adopting new laws or revising existing ones to conform to the R2P and the Guiding Principles (Mooney, 2005).

The plague of corruption synonymous with government business is a core impediment to government meeting up with the R2P of Displaced Persons in Nigeria. Corruption manifest itself in area of management and distribution of humanitarian funding by government agencies. Seeing items and materials meant for IDPs are common occurrences in market places – confirming that they were diverted by unscrupulous elements in the agencies and sold for personal profit. Alqali (2016) alludes to that as he noted that the agencies responsible for the protection and provision of basic needs for IDPs divert aids that are meant for displaced persons in the North. It’s haphazard execution of the ‘Kampala Convention’ on displaced persons occur through logistical, resources, legal services and they are reason *d’etre* for poor humanitarian condition of IDPs in the country. Oduwole and Fadeyi (2013) argued that national government only gives money for IDPs welfare and after that does not care if such money were well utilized.

NEMA a Federal Government Agency and SEMA have come under fire for inefficiency. Olagunju (2006) stressed that Nigerian government both at federal, state and local government levels do not have adequate infrastructure in place to address internally displaced persons’ needs. Challenges such as absence or weak data management protocol, incredible data base, weak legislation, poorly funded, insufficient facilities in health sectors are among the plights bedeviling effective emergency management operations in Nigeria (Olagunju, 2006).

The Challenges of the National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons

Nigeria has the third highest number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa. In 2020, it counted 2.7 million internally displaced people. Overall, Africa has the largest number of IDPs in the world. A country with these kind of daunting challenges on internally displaced persons urgently needs a strong national policy to tackle the challenges head on. Regrettably, one of the major problems of the National Policy remains that it has no legal status and therefore; incapable of enforcement powers against individuals or the delegated actors. Recognising the scale of the funding difficulties, the government has proposed the establishment of a Humanitarian Trust Fund to attract funding from individuals, corporate bodies, international agencies and others for activities in aid of IDPs. However, even if there were adequate funding, there is the problem of lack of accountability by those entrusted with public office and funds. Currently there are monumental challenges relating to prevention of displacement, assistance, return and relocation of IDPs. The National Policy has come at a time when the country actually requires a strong legal and other institutional framework – rather than a mere policy.

As of July 2022, the DTM identified a total of 2,455,190 IDPs in 501,758 households and 1,983,130 returnees in 323,277 households. Benue State in north central Nigeria hosts the most significant number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) accounting for 443,314. In the absence of mechanisms to monitor IDPs' ongoing situations, it has been impossible to determine how many may have recovered and achieved a durable solution. Other challenges includes responses in the core areas of intervention such as; reconstruction of social amenities destroyed by Boko Haram; establishment of IDPs camps; provision of security at the IDPs camps; provision of health and sanitation facilities; and supply of foods, beddings and clothing.

International Legal Instruments on the Protection of IDPs

The year 1991 generally marked a turning point in the plight of internally displaced persons the world over as the international conference on human rights protection for the internally displaced which was held in Washington DC, paved way for the adoption of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID) approved by the UN Commission on Human Rights (Bagshaw, 1999; UNHCR, 1996). This document defined the status of Internally Displaced Persons, sets out their rights and guarantees their protection during the whole process of their displacement to settlement. National governments were made to incorporate these policies in their national laws. States poor responses to matters affecting IDPs proved costly as attention and cars deteriorates across nations. To address the poor responsiveness of governments to displaced persons, the United Nations in its tenth-year memorial conference on the Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement in Oslo 2008, made a resolution to form political will for integrating the Guiding Principle on Internal Displacement into a global legal framework.

In response to the UN directive, The African Union's Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention, 2009) was also held in Uganda to birth a legally binding instrument at the regional level to prevent displacement and to protect and assist the displaced persons (IDMC, 2010). Despite the adoption of the Kampala Convention, the challenges confronting the displaced persons are still enormous (IDMC, 2020; UNHCR, 2021). Nigeria has signed and ratified 2 International Legal Instrument; the African Union Convention, and the 'Guiding principles' on the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons (Carr, 2009). The Guiding Principles and The African Union's Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), are a constant source of reference in Nigeria and they informed the development of the framework of the National Policy Document on IDPs in Nigeria (African Union, 2009).

Conclusion

Nigeria state since 2009 has been battling to provide succor to the plights of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Northeast, with little or nothing done to uncamped IDPs who fled the north either to their homes in the south east or those non indigenes but who decided to relocate their businesses in south east for safety by violent activities of Boko Haram, insurgents, Bandits and violent herdsmen. Nigeria's IDPs problem is largely associated with the unending insurgency, violence, banditry and herdsmen savage in the North and the attendant large displacement of people southwards – particularly south east. This orgy of violence is not going to abate any time soon as there is no political will to address the situation. The unending crisis has dissipated and broken the will and hopes of previously brave ones who thought that it will end soon as was the case during the Maitasine crises of the 1980s. Today's Nigeria is a highly political and ethno – religious divided country with mutual suspicion as never existed before. Evident in the lack of political will to address the unending crisis is the fact that the entire legal instruments meant to solve the problem such as The National policy on IDPs, the AU Convention and the UN Guiding Principles on internal displacement only operate on paper as there is no practical evidence of those policies. Further decisive and deliberate impactful actions are therefore necessary to protect the displaced persons.

Previously, South-East Nigeria was considered the **safest geopolitical zone** in the country but things have turned for the worst as the five states of. Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo have recorded spate of violent attacks in an unprecedented manner. **For instance**, the earlier quoted Mourns 2019 report is an indicator that South-East like other regions is under attack. Many believe that the decision by the Federal Government to adopt the all kinetic approach to address insecurity and violence in the south east will be counterproductive. Rehabilitation of the fleeing

IDPs from the north to south east in addition to other political solutions to address self-determination agitation in the south east will restore the region to its former glory of the most peaceful region in Nigeria.

Recommendations

The study recommendations included:

- i. In realisation that since culture is an important aspect of the people's life, government should strive to tailor her IDP policies to reflect same. The camping strategy of keeping Internally Displaced Persons camps which works in the North may not be same when applied in the South Eastern Region.
- ii. Government needs to do a census of all the displaced families and individuals who fled their homes and businesses in the North down to the Eastern Region so as to fashion out a rehabilitation strategy for displaced parents, youths, men that would provide a well-structured and workable social security scheme that will meaningfully engage the youths including those which would like to further their education or engage in trade or vocational enterprise, provide alternatives to crimes and criminal tendencies to IDPs especially the youths.
- iii. Government should create a disruptive grievance resolution mechanism that will ensure democratization and voice to the youths and promote inclusiveness across the different regions but especially in the south east.

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