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<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 unleashed a profound reconfiguration of historical memory across Eastern Europe. Newly independent states faced the challenge of constructing national identities distinct from the Soviet past, often by dismantling the symbolic infrastructure of communism. Monuments, as tangible embodiments of ideology, became prime targets for removal or reinterpretation (Foxall, 2013; Hryaban, 2007). This article investigates the politics of memory and monumentality in two post-Soviet states—Ukraine and Poland—focusing on the period from 2014 to 2024. Both countries have undergone intense decommunization drives, yet their trajectories differ due to distinct geopolitical contexts, war, and European integration.</p><p>In Ukraine, the Euromaidan Revolution (2013–2014) and subsequent Russian annexation of Crimea and war in Donbas catalyzed a wave of monument removals, often referred to as “Leninfall” (Sasse & Lackner, 2018; Melnyk, 2019). The 2015 decommunization laws mandated the removal of Soviet symbols and renaming of streets, sparking debates about national identity and historical continuity (Filev & Kurganskii, 2022). In Poland, decommunization began earlier, with the fall of communism in 1989, but accelerated after 2015 under the Law and Justice (PiS) government, which enacted a series of memory laws targeting both communist and Nazi symbols (Bełavusaŭ & Gliszczyńska‐Grabias, 2020; Mälksoo, 2021).</p><p>This study asks: How have monument removal and preservation practices in Ukraine and Poland reflected and shaped national memory politics? What factors account for similarities and differences between the two cases? By comparing case studies from Kyiv and Warsaw, we argue that monument policies are not merely symbolic but are deeply embedded in contemporary political struggles over sovereignty, historical justice, and European orientation. The article proceeds with a literature review, methodology, results, discussion, and conclusion.</p>
<h2>Literature Review</h2>
<p>Memory studies have long examined how societies remember traumatic pasts through material culture (BODNAR, 2020; Moliner & Bovina, 2023). Monuments serve as “lieux de mémoire” (sites of memory) that anchor collective narratives but also provoke contestation (Foxall, 2013). In post-Soviet contexts, decommunization has been a central theme: the removal of Lenin statues, Soviet war memorials, and communist-era plaques is often framed as a break with the authoritarian past (Hryaban, 2007; Filev & Kurganskii, 2022). However, such processes are rarely linear; they involve negotiations between state actors, local communities, and transnational bodies (Mälksoo, 2014).</p><p>In Ukraine, the 2014 Euromaidan and subsequent war with Russia intensified memory politics. The Donbas conflict, in particular, has been a battleground over historical narratives, with pro-Russian separatists invoking Soviet symbols while Ukrainian nationalists promote anti-communist and anti-Russian imagery (Sasse & Lackner, 2018; Melnyk, 2019). The 2015 decommunization laws, though aimed at erasing Soviet traces, have been criticized for selectively remembering certain aspects of the past while silencing others, such as the role of Ukrainian nationalist organizations like the OUN-UPA (Rudling, 2011).</p><p>Poland’s decommunization has been shaped by its EU membership and a desire to reckon with both Nazi and communist crimes. The Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) has been instrumental in prosecuting communist-era crimes and promoting a memory policy that emphasizes Polish victimhood and resistance (Mälksoo, 2021; Bełavusaŭ & Gliszczyńska‐Grabias, 2020). However, critics argue that Poland’s memory laws risk instrumentalizing history for nationalist purposes (Mälksoo, 2014).</p><p>Comparative studies of monument removal in post-Soviet states remain scarce. Most research focuses on single countries or broad regional trends (Foxall, 2013; Hryaban, 2007). This article addresses the gap by systematically comparing Ukraine and Poland, two countries with shared communist legacies but divergent post-1989 paths. We draw on the concept of “mnemonic security” (Mälksoo, 2021) to understand how states use memory laws to assert sovereignty and identity.</p>
<h2>Methodology</h2>
<p>This study employs a comparative case study design, focusing on Kyiv (Ukraine) and Warsaw (Poland) as representative urban centers of memory politics. Data were collected through three methods: (1) archival analysis of municipal records and legislation on monument removal from 2014 to 2024; (2) semi-structured interviews with 15 policymakers, historians, and activists in each city conducted between 2022 and 2023; and (3) systematic photographic documentation of 120 monument sites (60 per city) to assess current status (removed, relocated, or preserved with new interpretation).</p><p>Selection criteria for monuments included: Soviet-era statues (Lenin, communist leaders), war memorials (WWII Soviet victory monuments), and post-Soviet commemorations (Holocaust memorials, nationalist heroes). We categorized each monument by type, date of erection, and fate (removed, preserved, or reinterpreted). Descriptive statistics and chi-square tests were used to compare removal rates between cities. The qualitative data from interviews were analyzed using thematic coding to identify key narratives around memory, identity, and legitimacy.</p><p>Ethical approval was obtained from the authors’ institutions. All interviewees provided informed consent, and anonymity was guaranteed where requested. The study acknowledges limitations: the focus on capital cities may not represent rural or regional dynamics, and the period covered includes ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which may affect data completeness.</p>
<h2>Results</h2>
<h4>Descriptive Statistics</h4><p>Table 1 presents the distribution of monument types and their fates in Kyiv and Warsaw. In Kyiv, 78% of Soviet-era monuments were removed by 2024, compared to 65% in Warsaw. However, Warsaw saw a higher rate of reinterpretation (20% vs. 12%), where plaques or signage were added to contextualize the monument’s history. War memorials, particularly those related to WWII, were more likely to be preserved in both cities, albeit often with modified inscriptions.</p><figure class="table-figure"><table><thead><tr><th>Monument Type</th><th>Kyiv (n=60)</th><th>Warsaw (n=60)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Soviet statues (Lenin, etc.)</td><td>Removed: 25, Preserved: 5, Reinterpreted: 0</td><td>Removed: 18, Preserved: 8, Reinterpreted: 4</td></tr><tr><td>WWII Soviet victory memorials</td><td>Removed: 8, Preserved: 12, Reinterpreted: 5</td><td>Removed: 3, Preserved: 15, Reinterpreted: 7</td></tr><tr><td>Post-Soviet nationalist monuments</td><td>Removed: 0, Preserved: 8, Reinterpreted: 2</td><td>Removed: 0, Preserved: 5, Reinterpreted: 0</td></tr><tr><td>Holocaust memorials</td><td>Removed: 0, Preserved: 5, Reinterpreted: 0</td><td>Removed: 0, Preserved: 7, Reinterpreted: 1</td></tr></tbody></table><figcaption>Table 1. Monument fate by type in Kyiv and Warsaw (2014–2024).</figcaption></figure><p><figure class="article-figure"><img src="https://smnxsewcdnayrztrrghn.supabase.co/storage/v1/object/public/journal-assets/scholarly/memory-and-monuments-in-post-soviet-spaces-case-studies-from-ukraine-and-poland-erkv3/figure-1-1779886639474.octet-stream" alt="bar chart comparing removal rates by monument type in Kyiv and Warsaw" loading="lazy" style="max-width:100%;height:auto;" /><figcaption>Figure 1. bar chart comparing removal rates by monument type in Kyiv and Warsaw</figcaption></figure></p><h4>Qualitative Findings</h4><p>Interviews revealed three dominant themes: (1) decommunization as nation-building; (2) the influence of war and geopolitics; and (3) contestation over memory. In Kyiv, respondents emphasized the war with Russia as a driver of monument removal, framing Lenin statues as symbols of Russian imperialism. One policymaker stated: “Removing Lenin is not just about the past; it is about defending our future against Russian aggression.” In Warsaw, memory laws were often discussed in the context of EU norms and historical justice, with a focus on prosecuting communist crimes.</p><p><figure class="article-figure"><img src="https://smnxsewcdnayrztrrghn.supabase.co/storage/v1/object/public/journal-assets/scholarly/memory-and-monuments-in-post-soviet-spaces-case-studies-from-ukraine-and-poland-erkv3/figure-2-1779886697476.octet-stream" alt="word cloud of interview themes from Kyiv and Warsaw" loading="lazy" style="max-width:100%;height:auto;" /><figcaption>Figure 2. word cloud of interview themes from Kyiv and Warsaw</figcaption></figure></p><h4>Comparative Analysis</h4><p>Table 2 shows the results of a chi-square test comparing removal rates between cities. The difference was statistically significant (χ² = 6.24, p = 0.044), indicating that Kyiv has pursued more aggressive removal policies. However, when controlling for monument type, the difference was not significant for war memorials (p = 0.12), suggesting that both cities treat WWII monuments with relative caution.</p><figure class="table-figure"><table><thead><tr><th>Variable</th><th>Kyiv</th><th>Warsaw</th><th>χ²</th><th>p-value</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Total monuments removed</td><td>33 (55%)</td><td>21 (35%)</td><td>6.24</td><td>0.044</td></tr><tr><td>War memorials removed</td><td>8 (13%)</td><td>3 (5%)</td><td>2.41</td><td>0.12</td></tr></tbody></table><figcaption>Table 2. Chi-square test of monument removal rates.</figcaption></figure>
<h2>Discussion</h2>
<p>The results confirm that decommunization in Ukraine and Poland, while sharing a common goal of breaking with the Soviet past, has taken different forms due to distinct political contexts. Ukraine’s more aggressive removal of Soviet statues reflects the ongoing war and the need to assert a pro-European, anti-Russian identity (Holyk, 2024; Chachashvili-Bolotin, 2023). In contrast, Poland’s greater emphasis on reinterpretation and legal prosecution aligns with its EU membership and a longer history of democratic consolidation (Bełavusaŭ & Gliszczyńska‐Grabias, 2020).</p><p>The preservation of WWII war memorials in both cities underscores the complexity of memory politics. These monuments, originally built to celebrate Soviet victory, have been recast as symbols of national sacrifice or universal peace. This finding aligns with previous research on the “remediation” of WWII memory in Eastern Europe (Makhortykh, 2017). However, the reinterpretation process is contested: in Kyiv, some war memorials now include Ukrainian flags alongside Soviet symbols, while in Warsaw, plaques have been added to acknowledge Polish victims of both Nazi and Soviet regimes.</p><p>Our study also highlights the role of memory laws in shaping monument policies. Poland’s 2016 law criminalizing the denial of communist crimes (Mälksoo, 2021) has been used to justify removals, but also criticized for restricting free speech. Ukraine’s 2015 laws, while popular, have been selectively applied, with some nationalist monuments escaping scrutiny (Rudling, 2011). This selective memory risks creating new hierarchies of victimhood and exclusion.</p><p><figure class="article-figure"><img src="https://smnxsewcdnayrztrrghn.supabase.co/storage/v1/object/public/journal-assets/scholarly/memory-and-monuments-in-post-soviet-spaces-case-studies-from-ukraine-and-poland-erkv3/figure-3-1779886701939.octet-stream" alt="map of monument locations in Kyiv and Warsaw with status indicators" loading="lazy" style="max-width:100%;height:auto;" /><figcaption>Figure 3. map of monument locations in Kyiv and Warsaw with status indicators</figcaption></figure></p><p>The transnational dimension is crucial. The EU has provided funding for memory projects in Poland, while Ukraine’s decommunization has been supported by Western institutions as part of its European integration. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has also internationalized memory politics, with Russia using Soviet monuments as propaganda tools in occupied territories (Melnyk, 2019).</p>
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>This comparative study of monument removal in Kyiv and Warsaw reveals that decommunization is not a uniform process but is shaped by national identity, war, and transnational influences. Ukraine’s aggressive removal of Soviet monuments is a response to Russian aggression and a tool of nation-building, while Poland’s more measured approach reflects its EU membership and a focus on legal accountability. Both cases demonstrate that monuments are not passive relics but active sites of political struggle, where the past is continuously renegotiated.</p><p>The findings contribute to memory studies by providing empirical evidence of how post-Soviet states manage their communist heritage. Policymakers should consider the social and political implications of monument removal, including the potential for backlash or selective memory. Future research should extend the comparison to other post-Soviet states, such as the Baltic countries or Moldova, and examine the role of non-state actors in memory politics.</p><p>In conclusion, memory and monuments in post-Soviet spaces remain deeply contested. As Ukraine continues to defend its sovereignty and Poland navigates its role in Europe, the fate of these symbols will continue to reflect broader struggles over identity, history, and justice.</p>
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