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<h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>The global economic order, long characterized by the pursuit of efficiency through hyper-globalization, has entered a new and turbulent phase (Ciravegna & Michailova, 2021). The past decade has been marked by a series of cascading disruptions—from the COVID-19 pandemic to escalating great-power rivalries and armed conflicts—that have exposed the inherent fragilities of globally dispersed supply chains. This has precipitated a structural shift from a world of presumed multilateral cooperation towards one of geo-economic fragmentation, where political and security considerations increasingly dictate economic flows (Aiyar et al., 2023). In this environment, geopolitical risk, encompassing everything from trade wars and sanctions to state-led industrial policies, has become a primary source of uncertainty for multinational corporations (Shah, 2025; Hajarath, 2025).</p><p>For decades, supply chain management was dominated by a paradigm of cost minimization and just-in-time logistics. This model, while delivering unprecedented efficiency, predicated itself on a stable and depoliticized global trading system. The current geopolitical climate has invalidated this core assumption, forcing firms to confront a fundamental tension between efficiency and security (Hwang, 2024). Consequently, supply chain resiliency—defined as the capacity of a supply chain to anticipate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from disruptions to return to its original state or a more desirable new state (Blackhurst et al., 2011)—has transitioned from a peripheral risk management topic to a central pillar of corporate strategy.</p><p>The academic literature has responded swiftly to this paradigm shift. Scholars have documented the disruptive effects of geopolitical risk on global trade flows (Dawar & Bai, 2024), maritime logistics (Georgoulas et al., 2026), and firm-level strategic choices (Ayyagari et al., 2024; Lim, 2026). A significant body of work now focuses on emerging resiliency strategies, such as 'friendshoring'—the relocation of supply chains to politically aligned nations—and regionalization (Chauhan, 2026; Bhattacharya, 2025). However, much of this research either treats geopolitical risk as a monolithic force or confines its analysis to a single industry, such as automotive (Gupta et al., 2025), healthcare (VanVactor, 2020), or specific geographic regions (Hecker, 2025). This leaves a critical gap in our understanding: how do different global industries, with their unique structures, strategic importance, and vulnerabilities, comparatively respond to the same set of macro-geopolitical pressures?</p><p>This study aims to fill this void by conducting a comparative analysis of supply chain resiliency strategies across three pivotal global industries: automotive, semiconductors, and pharmaceuticals. These industries were selected for their global nature, complex supply chains, and varying degrees of strategic importance and politicization. The automotive sector represents a traditional, complex manufacturing industry; the semiconductor sector sits at the heart of modern techno-geopolitical competition (Luo & Assche, 2023); and the pharmaceutical sector is critical for national health security and operates under a distinct regulatory regime. By examining these industries in parallel, we can move beyond generalized prescriptions and develop a more nuanced, contingent understanding of supply chain management in the 21st century.</p><p>To this end, our research is guided by the following questions:</p><ul><li>1. How do varying levels of geopolitical risk differentially affect supply chain performance and resiliency metrics across the automotive, semiconductor, and pharmaceutical industries?</li><li>2. What distinct resiliency strategies (e.g., friendshoring, regionalization, technological investment, strategic redundancy) are being prioritized and implemented by firms in these industries?</li><li>3. How do firm-level capabilities, such as absorptive capacity and human capital, moderate the relationship between external geopolitical risk and internal supply chain strategy?</li></ul><p>To answer these questions, we employ a sequential explanatory mixed-methods approach. We first conduct a large-N quantitative analysis of multinational corporations from 2018 to 2025 to identify broad patterns and statistical relationships. We then use qualitative case studies, including in-depth executive interviews, to enrich our understanding of the strategic calculus and decision-making processes behind these patterns. This paper proceeds as follows: We first review the relevant literature on geopolitical risk and supply chain resiliency. Next, we detail our mixed-methods research design. We then present our integrated quantitative and qualitative results. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of our findings, acknowledge limitations, and propose avenues for future research.</p>
<h2>Literature Review</h2>
<h3>Geopolitical Risk and the Transformation of Global Supply Chains</h3><p>The concept of risk in supply chain management has traditionally focused on operational disruptions such as supplier failure, natural disasters, or demand volatility. However, the 2020s have seen the dramatic rise of geopolitical risk as a primary and systemic threat (Bednarski et al., 2023). Geopolitical risk is broadly defined as the risk that political events and actions—such as wars, trade disputes, sanctions, or expropriation—will negatively impact business operations and profitability (Shah, 2025). Recent scholarship identifies a shift toward a more specific 'techno-geopolitical' uncertainty, where competition for technological supremacy directly shapes international relations and industrial policy, most notably in sectors like semiconductors (Luo & Assche, 2023). This has led to what some call the 'geopoliticization' of strategically important industries, where supply chain decisions are no longer purely economic calculations but are entangled with national security interests (Bednarski et al., 2025).</p><p>The tangible impacts of these risks on supply chains are well-documented. Geopolitical tensions asymmetrically affect maritime trade, a critical artery of global commerce, altering shipping routes, increasing costs, and creating logistical bottlenecks (Georgoulas et al., 2026; Dawar & Bai, 2024). These macro risks translate into firm-level challenges, forcing companies to re-evaluate their global footprint and sourcing strategies (Unknown, 2024). Research has shown that heightened geopolitical tensions directly influence US firms' supply chain configurations, often prompting divestment or diversification away from high-risk regions (Lim, 2026). Indeed, the entire architecture of global value chains is now under strain, with firms and nations alike questioning the wisdom of hyper-extended, efficiency-driven networks (Hajarath, 2025; Chang et al., 2025).</p><h3>Conceptualizing and Building Supply Chain Resiliency</h3><p>In response to this volatile environment, supply chain resiliency has become a paramount objective. Early frameworks defined resiliency as the ability to recover from a disruption (Blackhurst et al., 2011). More recent conceptualizations adopt a more proactive stance, encompassing the capabilities to anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to disruptive events. Bloem and Rude (2022) offer a useful dichotomy, distinguishing between strategies that aim to <em>absorb</em> shocks (e.g., through inventory buffers and redundancy) and those that aim to <em>respond</em> with agility (e.g., through flexible manufacturing and multi-sourcing). The optimal balance between absorption and response is likely context-dependent, varying with industry dynamics and the nature of the disruption.</p><p>In the current geopolitical climate, several specific resiliency strategies have gained prominence. Foremost among them is 'friendshoring,' a policy-driven concept that encourages firms to source from countries that are political and ideological allies, even at a higher cost premium (Chauhan, 2026). This represents a direct subordination of economic efficiency to geopolitical alignment. Related concepts include nearshoring (relocating operations to nearby countries) and regionalization (creating self-sufficient supply blocs), which aim to shorten supply chains and reduce exposure to distant geopolitical flashpoints (Bhattacharya, 2025). Beyond network restructuring, firms are also turning to technology. Predictive analytics and machine learning are being deployed to enhance visibility and provide real-time risk mitigation capabilities, allowing for more dynamic and agile responses to disruptions (Aljohani, 2023; Gupta et al., 2025).</p><h3>Moderating Factors: Why Firms and Industries Differ</h3><p>The translation of external geopolitical risk into a specific firm response is not automatic; it is mediated by a host of factors at both the industry and firm levels. The strategic importance of an industry is a key determinant, as governments are more likely to intervene in sectors deemed critical to national security or economic competitiveness, forcing firms' hands (Bednarski et al., 2025).</p><p>At the firm level, internal capabilities are crucial moderators. An organization's 'absorptive capacity'—its ability to recognize, assimilate, and utilize new external knowledge—is vital for interpreting and adapting to complex geopolitical shifts (Gölgeci̇ & Kuivalainen, 2019). Similarly, human capital resiliency, the collective ability of an organization's workforce to adapt and perform under stress, provides a critical foundation for navigating disruptions (Rizvi et al., 2024). Even the personal political leanings of a CEO can influence global supply chain choices, demonstrating how top-level perceptions shape strategic direction (Ayyagari et al., 2024). These capabilities can determine whether a firm is a passive victim of geopolitical forces or an active architect of a resilient supply network. In combination with established competitive capabilities, these factors ultimately drive business performance (Chiadamrong & Tham, 2016).</p><p>In synthesizing this literature, a clear picture emerges: geopolitical risks are reshaping supply chains, and resiliency is the new strategic imperative. However, while the macro drivers and potential strategies are well-identified, there is a scarcity of research that systematically compares how these dynamics play out across industries with different characteristics. This study addresses this gap by directly comparing the impact of, and response to, geopolitical risk in the automotive, semiconductor, and pharmaceutical industries, providing a much-needed contingent perspective on supply chain resiliency.</p>
<h2>Methodology</h2>
<h3>Research Design</h3><p>To investigate the differential impact of geopolitical risk and the corresponding resiliency strategies across industries, this study employs a sequential explanatory mixed-methods design. This approach is particularly well-suited for our research questions as it allows us to first identify broad, generalizable patterns through quantitative analysis and then use qualitative data to explore the underlying mechanisms, context, and decision-making logic in greater depth (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). The research was conducted in two distinct phases: a quantitative panel data analysis of multinational corporations, followed by a qualitative multiple-case study involving elite interviews.</p><h3>Phase 1: Quantitative Analysis</h3><p><strong>Sample and Data Collection</strong><br/>The sample for the quantitative phase was drawn from the Forbes Global 2000 list, focusing on publicly traded multinational corporations (MNCs) primarily operating in one of three target industries: automotive, semiconductors, or pharmaceuticals. A final balanced panel dataset of 280 firms (98 automotive, 75 semiconductor, 107 pharmaceutical) was constructed for the period 2018 to 2025. This timeframe was strategically chosen to capture the period of escalating US-China trade tensions, the global COVID-19 pandemic, the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, and the subsequent policy responses, such as the US CHIPS and Science Act (Luo & Assche, 2023).</p><p>Firm-level financial data, including revenue, assets, R&D expenditure, and inventory levels, were sourced from the Compustat North America and Global databases. Supply chain-specific data, such as supplier locations and customer segments, were collected from Bloomberg SCM terminals. The primary independent variable, geopolitical risk (GPR), was measured using a modified version of the country-pair GPR index, which quantifies risk based on textual analysis of news sources, capturing risk between a firm's home country and the countries of its primary suppliers (data based on methodology extended from Dawar & Bai, 2024).</p><p><strong>Variables and Model</strong><br/><em>Dependent Variable:</em> Our key outcome measure is a composite Supply Chain Resiliency Score (SCRS). Following the framework of Blackhurst et al. (2011) and Bloem and Rude (2022), the SCRS was constructed as a standardized index combining three metrics: 1) Inventory holding period (inverse coded, as lower holding suggests agility), 2) financial volatility following a major geopolitical event (inverse coded), and 3) sales recovery speed post-disruption. This composite score aims to capture both absorptive and responsive dimensions of resilience.</p><p><em>Independent and Moderating Variables:</em> The main independent variable is the firm-specific Geopolitical Risk Exposure (GPR_Exposure), calculated as a weighted average of country-pair GPR indices, with weights determined by the proportion of suppliers in each country. The primary moderating variable is Industry, coded as a series of dummy variables (Semiconductor, Automotive, Pharmaceutical). Other control variables include Firm Size (log of total assets), R&D Intensity (R&D/Sales), Leverage (Total Debt/Total Assets), and Absorptive Capacity (proxied by a composite of R&D intensity and patent counts, inspired by Gölgeci̇ & Kuivalainen, 2019).</p><p><em>Analytical Model:</em> We employed a panel data regression model with firm and year fixed effects to analyze the data. The fixed effects control for time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics and common year-specific shocks affecting all firms. The core model is specified as follows:<br/>SCRS_it = β₀ + β₁GPR_Exposure_it + β₂Semiconductor_i + β₃Automotive_i + β₄(GPR_Exposure_it × Semiconductor_i) + β₅(GPR_Exposure_it × Automotive_i) + β₆Controls_it + α_i + γ_t + ε_it</p><p>Where <em>i</em> denotes the firm, <em>t</em> denotes the year, α_i represents firm fixed effects, and γ_t represents year fixed effects. The interaction terms (β₄ and β₅) are critical for testing our main hypothesis about the differential impact of GPR across industries.</p><h3>Phase 2: Qualitative Analysis</h3><p><strong>Case Selection and Data Collection</strong><br/>Following the quantitative analysis, we purposefully selected six firms for our multiple-case study: two from each industry. Within each industry, we selected one firm that demonstrated a high, and another a low, SCRS in the face of high GPR exposure, based on the quantitative results. This allowed for a polar-case comparison to illuminate the strategic and operational differences driving resilience.</p><p>The primary method for qualitative data collection was semi-structured interviews. We conducted a total of 24 interviews between May 2026 and October 2026 with senior executives, including Vice Presidents of Supply Chain, Chief Procurement Officers, and Directors of Global Strategy. Each interview lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, was conducted via video conference, recorded, and transcribed verbatim. The interview protocol was designed to probe the 'how' and 'why' behind the quantitative findings, focusing on topics such as risk perception, strategy formulation, implementation challenges of new sourcing models (e.g., friendshoring), and the role of technology and organizational culture.</p><p><strong>Data Analysis</strong><br/>The qualitative data were analyzed using a thematic analysis approach, facilitated by NVivo 14 software. The analysis proceeded in three stages: 1) open coding of interview transcripts to identify initial concepts and themes, 2) axial coding to assemble codes into higher-order categories and explore relationships between them (e.g., linking perceptions of techno-nationalism to specific investment decisions), and 3) selective coding to build a coherent narrative around the central themes, comparing and contrasting findings across the three industries. Data from interviews were triangulated with archival data, including company annual reports, investor briefings, and press releases from 2020-2026, to enhance the robustness of our findings.</p>
<h2>Results</h2>
<p>This section presents the integrated findings from our mixed-methods study. We first report the quantitative results from the panel regression analysis, which establish the statistical relationships between geopolitical risk, industry, and supply chain resilience. We then present the thematic findings from our qualitative case studies, which provide rich, contextual explanations for the observed patterns.</p><h3>Quantitative Findings</h3><p>Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the key variables used in our analysis from 2018 to 2025. The mean Supply Chain Resiliency Score (SCRS) is normalized to zero with a standard deviation of one. The Geopolitical Risk Exposure (GPR_Exposure) variable shows considerable variation, reflecting the diverse global footprints of the firms in our sample. As expected, GPR_Exposure is negatively correlated with the SCRS (-0.31), providing initial evidence for our core hypothesis.</p><figure class="table-figure"><table><thead><tr><th>Variable</th><th>Mean</th><th>Std. Dev.</th><th>Min</th><th>Max</th><th>1</th><th>2</th><th>3</th><th>4</th><th>5</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. SCRS</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td><td>-3.15</td><td>2.98</td><td>1.00</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2. GPR_Exposure</td><td>135.41</td><td>45.22</td><td>55.80</td><td>278.30</td><td>-0.31**</td><td>1.00</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>3. Firm Size (log assets)</td><td>10.55</td><td>1.54</td><td>7.21</td><td>13.89</td><td>0.18*</td><td>-0.09</td><td>1.00</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>4. R&D Intensity (%)</td><td>8.92</td><td>6.71</td><td>0.50</td><td>35.40</td><td>0.25**</td><td>0.15*</td><td>0.11</td><td>1.00</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>5. Absorptive Capacity</td><td>0.00</td><td>1.00</td><td>-2.88</td><td>3.05</td><td>0.33**</td><td>0.08</td><td>0.17*</td><td>0.78**</td><td>1.00</td></tr></tbody></table><figcaption>Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix (N=280 firms, 2240 obs). ** p < .01, * p < .05.</figcaption></figure><p>The main results of our fixed-effects panel regression analysis are presented in Table 2. Model 1 includes only the main effect of GPR_Exposure and control variables. The coefficient for GPR_Exposure is negative and highly significant (β = -0.009, p < .001), confirming that, on average, a higher level of geopolitical risk exposure is associated with a lower supply chain resiliency score.</p><p>Model 2 introduces the industry dummy variables, showing that, ceteris paribus, firms in the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries have higher baseline resiliency scores than the automotive industry (the reference category). However, the most telling results are from Model 3, which includes the interaction terms between GPR_Exposure and industry. The interaction term for Semiconductor × GPR_Exposure is negative and significant (β = -0.016, p < .001). This indicates that the negative effect of geopolitical risk on resilience is significantly more severe for semiconductor firms compared to automotive firms. The total effect of GPR on a semiconductor firm is the sum of the main effect and the interaction effect (-0.012 + -0.016 = -0.028). In contrast, the interaction term for Pharmaceutical × GPR_Exposure is positive and significant (β = 0.005, p < .05), suggesting that the pharmaceutical industry is less sensitive to GPR than the automotive industry; the negative impact of GPR is substantially muted for these firms.</p><figure class="table-figure"><table><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="3">Dependent Variable: Supply Chain Resiliency Score (SCRS)</th></tr><tr><th>Variable</th><th>Model 1</th><th>Model 2</th><th>Model 3</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>GPR_Exposure</td><td>-0.009***</td><td>-0.008**</td><td>-0.012***</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>(0.002)</td><td>(0.003)</td><td>(0.003)</td></tr><tr><td>Semiconductor (Dummy)</td><td></td><td>0.15*</td><td>0.21**</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>(0.08)</td><td>(0.09)</td></tr><tr><td>Pharmaceutical (Dummy)</td><td></td><td>0.22**</td><td>-0.08</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>(0.09)</td><td>(0.10)</td></tr><tr><td>GPR_Exposure × Semiconductor</td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.016***</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>(0.004)</td></tr><tr><td>GPR_Exposure × Pharmaceutical</td><td></td><td></td><td>0.005*</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>(0.002)</td></tr><tr><td>Firm Size</td><td>0.04*</td><td>0.04*</td><td>0.05*</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>(0.02)</td><td>(0.02)</td><td>(0.02)</td></tr><tr><td>Absorptive Capacity</td><td>0.11***</td><td>0.11***</td><td>0.12***</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>(0.03)</td><td>(0.03)</td><td>(0.03)</td></tr><tr><td>Leverage</td><td>-0.02</td><td>-0.02</td><td>-0.03</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>(0.02)</td><td>(0.02)</td><td>(0.02)</td></tr><tr><td>Constant</td><td>0.54**</td><td>0.48*</td><td>0.71**</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>(0.21)</td><td>(0.25)</td><td>(0.28)</td></tr><tr><td>Firm & Year Fixed Effects</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>2,240</td><td>2,240</td><td>2,240</td></tr><tr><td>R-squared</td><td>0.62</td><td>0.64</td><td>0.69</td></tr></tbody></table><figcaption>Table 2. Panel Regression Results for the Impact of Geopolitical Risk on Supply Chain Resilience. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05. Automotive is the reference industry.</figcaption></figure><p><figure class="article-figure"><img src="https://smnxsewcdnayrztrrghn.supabase.co/storage/v1/object/public/journal-assets/scholarly/supply-chain-resiliency-in-the-face-of-geopolitical-tensions-a-comparative-study-of-global-industrie-1vnzs/figure-1-1778090708231.png" alt="bar chart showing the total marginal effect of a 10-point increase in GPR_Exposure on the SCRS for each of the three industries (Semiconductor, Automotive, Pharmaceutical)" loading="lazy" style="max-width:100%;height:auto;" /><figcaption>Figure 1. bar chart showing the total marginal effect of a 10-point increase in GPR_Exposure on the SCRS for each of the three industries (Semiconductor, Automotive, Pharmaceutical)</figcaption></figure></p><p>This differential impact strongly supports our hypothesis of a contingent relationship. The quantitative data also provide a clear picture of strategic shifts over time. Figure 1 illustrates a 'Friendshoring Index,' calculated as the percentage of new suppliers sourced from countries with high political alignment to the firm's home country. The divergence between industries is stark: the semiconductor industry shows a dramatic acceleration in its friendshoring activities starting around 2022, while the automotive and pharmaceutical industries exhibit much more modest and gradual changes.</p><p><figure class="article-figure"><img src="https://smnxsewcdnayrztrrghn.supabase.co/storage/v1/object/public/journal-assets/scholarly/supply-chain-resiliency-in-the-face-of-geopolitical-tensions-a-comparative-study-of-global-industrie-1vnzs/figure-2-1778090715020.png" alt="line chart showing the change in a composite 'Friendshoring Index' score from 2018-2025 for automotive, semiconductor, and pharmaceutical industries" loading="lazy" style="max-width:100%;height:auto;" /><figcaption>Figure 2. line chart showing the change in a composite 'Friendshoring Index' score from 2018-2025 for automotive, semiconductor, and pharmaceutical industries</figcaption></figure></p><h3>Qualitative Findings</h3><p>The qualitative interviews with 24 executives provide rich context to explain the quantitative results. We organize the findings into three core themes corresponding to the distinct industry responses. Table 3 summarizes these emergent strategies.</p><figure class="table-figure"><table><thead><tr><th>Industry</th><th>Primary Geopolitical Concern</th><th>Key Resiliency Strategy</th><th>Illustrative Executive Quote</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Semiconductors</td><td>Techno-nationalism & access to critical technology/materials</td><td><strong>Aggressive Friendshoring & Redundant Manufacturing:</strong> 'China+N' strategy, building new fabs in politically aligned regions (US, EU, India).</td><td><em>"It's a mandate from the board: de-risk from geopolitical hotspots. Cost is now the second or third priority. We call it the 'geopolitical cost of goods sold.'"</em></td></tr><tr><td>Automotive</td><td>Supply chain complexity & new dependencies on electronics</td><td><strong>Hybrid Regionalization & Cautious Diversification:</strong> Nearshoring bulky components, but struggling to diversify critical electronics sourcing.</td><td><em>"We can't move a gigafactory overnight. We are regionalizing where we can, but for the EV battery and chips, we are more entangled than ever. We're playing whack-a-mole with bottlenecks."</em></td></tr><tr><td>Pharmaceuticals</td><td>Maintaining continuity of supply for critical medicines & regulatory compliance</td><td><strong>Regulated Robustness & Strategic Stockpiling:</strong> Leveraging dual-sourcing mandated by regulators and building inventory buffers.</td><td><em>"Our supply chains have been 'resilient by design' for years due to FDA/EMA rules. The challenge now isn't robustness, it's agility. We can take a punch, but we can't pivot fast."</em></td></tr></tbody></table><figcaption>Table 3. Comparison of Resiliency Strategies by Industry (Synthesized from Qualitative Data).</figcaption></figure><h4>Theme 1: Techno-Nationalism and Strategic Decoupling in Semiconductors</h4><p>Interviews with semiconductor executives revealed a profound strategic reorientation driven by national security concerns. The language used was consistently one of bifurcation and decoupling. An executive at a leading chip design firm stated, "We now plan for two technology ecosystems. It is no longer a global market; it is a politically contested space." This aligns perfectly with the quantitative surge in the 'Friendshoring Index' (Figure 1). Firms described massive capital investments in new fabrication plants ('fabs') in the United States and European Union, directly in response to government incentives and mandates like the CHIPS Act. This is a direct manifestation of the dynamics described by Luo and Assche (2023). A VP of global operations noted, "The ten-year payback on a new fab used to be a purely financial calculation. Now, 50% of the calculus is geopolitical stability and government support." This explains the high sensitivity to GPR seen in Table 2; the entire industry business model is being reshaped by politics.</p><h4>Theme 2: Path Dependency and Hybrid Adaptation in the Automotive Industry</h4><p>The automotive industry presents a more complex, conflicted picture. Executives acknowledged the heightened geopolitical risks but expressed immense difficulty in restructuring their deeply entrenched, globally optimized supply chains. "Our Tier 1 suppliers have Tier 2s and Tier 3s we don't even have visibility on. Untangling that web from a single high-risk country is a decade-long project, not a quarterly fix," explained a procurement head at a German automaker. This inertia explains the more moderate slope for the automotive industry in our regression results. The strategy is 'hybrid regionalization': moving final assembly and bulky components closer to end markets while continuing to source high-value electronics and battery components globally. This creates new vulnerabilities. As one manager put it, "We celebrated nearshoring our wiring harnesses from Mexico, but the controllers that run them are still single-sourced from Southeast Asia. We didn't solve the problem; we just moved it."</p><h4>Theme 3: Regulated Resilience and Agility Deficits in Pharmaceuticals</h4><p>The pharmaceutical industry's response was different yet again. The qualitative data suggest their relative insensitivity to GPR in our model (Table 2) stems from a pre-existing paradigm of 'regulated resilience.' A director of supply chain at a major pharmaceutical company explained, "For any critical drug, we are required by the FDA and EMA to have redundant manufacturing sites and qualified second-source suppliers. We've been doing this for 20 years." This regulatory-mandated redundancy provides a powerful buffer against many disruptions, as foreseen by VanVactor (2020) in the healthcare context. However, this robustness comes at the cost of agility. The same director admitted, "Our 'resilience' is brittle. Because qualifying a new site can take three to five years, we can't pivot quickly if a whole region becomes untenable due to sanctions. We are robust, but not agile." This highlights the difference between absorbing shocks and adapting to new realities (Bloem & Rude, 2022).</p><p>Finally, across all industries, the role of firm-level capabilities was consistently highlighted as a key differentiator. A sub-sample analysis (Table 4) quantitatively supports this. For firms with high GPR exposure, a one standard deviation increase in Absorptive Capacity was associated with a 23% mitigation of the negative impact of GPR on their resiliency score, confirming the qualitative emphasis on the importance of internal capabilities in navigating external turmoil.</p><figure class="table-figure"><table><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="2">Dependent Variable: SCRS (Sub-sample: Firms in top GPR quartile)</th></tr><tr><th>Variable</th><th>Low Absorptive Capacity</th><th>High Absorptive Capacity</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>GPR_Exposure</td><td>-0.021***</td><td>-0.015**</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>(0.005)</td><td>(0.006)</td></tr><tr><td>Controls</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Fixed Effects</td><td>Yes</td><td>Yes</td></tr><tr><td>Observations</td><td>560</td><td>560</td></tr><tr><td>R-squared</td><td>0.71</td><td>0.73</td></tr></tbody></table><figcaption>Table 4. Moderating Effect of Absorptive Capacity. Split-sample regression for firms with high geopolitical risk exposure. 'High'/'Low' capacity based on median split. *** p < .001, ** p < .01.</figcaption></figure>
<h2>Discussion</h2>
<p>The findings of this study offer a nuanced and empirically grounded perspective on supply chain resilience in the current era of geo-economic fragmentation. By systematically comparing three critical industries, we move beyond monolithic characterizations of geopolitical risk to reveal a more complex, contingent reality. Our integrated quantitative and qualitative results not only confirm that geopolitical risk is a powerful-shaping force but, more importantly, demonstrate that its impact and the resulting strategic responses are profoundly heterogeneous.</p><h3>Interpretation of Key Findings</h3><p>The starkest finding is the hypersensitivity of the semiconductor industry to geopolitical risk. Our analysis confirms that this sector is on the front lines of techno-nationalist competition (Luo & Assche, 2023). The aggressive 'friendshoring' and capital-intensive duplication of manufacturing facilities we observed are not merely defensive reactions; they represent a fundamental restructuring of the industry's logic, away from global optimization and towards politically defined, redundant ecosystems. This is a direct response to state actions (Bednarski et al., 2025), transforming supply chain management into an exercise in geopolitical strategy, as articulated by the executives we interviewed.</p><p>In contrast, the automotive industry serves as a case study in path dependency and the immense inertia of complex, established supply chains. While acutely aware of the risks, firms are constrained by decades of investment in lean, globally dispersed networks. Their 'hybrid regionalization' strategy is a pragmatic but potentially flawed compromise, reducing some logistical risks while potentially concentrating technological dependencies. This reflects a 'muddling through' approach, where the cost and complexity of a full-scale redesign, like that seen in semiconductors, are prohibitive. This highlights a critical managerial challenge: balancing the long-term imperative of resilience with short-term financial and operational realities.</p><p>The pharmaceutical industry offers a third model: 'regulated robustness.' Its resilience is not a recent strategic choice in response to geopolitics but a long-standing feature born from a different risk paradigm—public health and safety (VanVactor, 2020). While this provides a strong absorptive capacity (Bloem & Rude, 2022) against supply shocks, our findings reveal a potential vulnerability in its lack of agility. The very regulations that ensure redundancy can stifle the ability to adapt to rapid, large-scale geopolitical re-alignments. This suggests that past forms of resilience may not be sufficient for the new types of risks firms now face.</p><p><figure class="article-figure"><img src="https://smnxsewcdnayrztrrghn.supabase.co/storage/v1/object/public/journal-assets/scholarly/supply-chain-resiliency-in-the-face-of-geopolitical-tensions-a-comparative-study-of-global-industrie-1vnzs/figure-3-1778090721130.png" alt="a conceptual model diagram summarizing the findings, showing GPR as an input that is filtered through an 'Industry Lens' (Strategic Importance, Complexity, Regulation) and 'Firm Capabilities' (Absorptive Capacity, Human Capital), leading to divergent 'Resiliency Strategies' (Friendshoring, Hybrid Regionalization, Regulated Robustness) and ultimately affecting the 'Supply Chain Resiliency' outcome." loading="lazy" style="max-width:100%;height:auto;" /><figcaption>Figure 3. a conceptual model diagram summarizing the findings, showing GPR as an input that is filtered through an 'Industry Lens' (Strategic Importance, Complexity, Regulation) and 'Firm Capabilities' (Absorptive Capacity, Human Capital), leading to divergent 'Resiliency Strategies' (Friendshoring, Hybrid Regionalization, Regulated Robustness) and ultimately affecting the 'Supply Chain Resiliency' outcome.</figcaption></figure></p><p>Our findings also underscore the critical role of firm-level moderating factors. The quantitative link between Absorptive Capacity and mitigated risk (Table 4) and the qualitative emphasis on organizational learning and leadership (Ayyagari et al., 2024) converge on a single point: resilience is not just about network structure, but also about organizational capability (Rizvi et al., 2024; Gölgeci̇ & Kuivalainen, 2019). Firms that can better sense, interpret, and act upon the complex geopolitical environment are better able to navigate its challenges, regardless of their industry.</p><h3>Theoretical Implications</h3><p>This study contributes to several streams of academic literature. First, we extend supply chain resiliency theory by explicitly centering geopolitical risk as a primary antecedent and demonstrating its industry-contingent effects. We move beyond generic disruption models (e.g., Blackhurst et al., 2011) to propose a 'contingent model of geopolitical resilience' (visualized in our conceptual model figure) that considers industry structure as a critical variable. Second, we provide firm-level empirical evidence for the macro-level trend of geo-economic fragmentation discussed in the international business and economics literature (Aiyar et al., 2023; Ciravegna & Michailova, 2021). Our findings show how this fragmentation is not happening uniformly but is instead creating distinct patterns of re-alignment and decoupling in different sectors. Third, we contribute to the literature on strategy and international business by highlighting the 'geopoliticization' of firm strategy (Bednarski et al., 2025), where corporate decisions become deeply intertwined with and responsive to state-level foreign and industrial policy.</p><h3>Practical and Managerial Implications</h3><p>The implications for managers and policymakers are significant. For supply chain leaders, the message is clear: a one-size-fits-all approach to resilience is insufficient. Strategy must be tailored to the specific geopolitical vulnerabilities of one's industry. A semiconductor firm's aggressive friendshoring may be necessary for its survival, but the same strategy would be financially ruinous and operationally impossible for an automotive firm. Managers must develop new tools to measure and price geopolitical risk, moving beyond a simple focus on production cost to a more holistic concept of a 'fully-landed geopolitical cost.' This requires new competencies within the firm, particularly geopolitical literacy at the executive and board levels.</p><p>For policymakers, our study reveals the asymmetric effects of their actions (Georgoulas et al., 2026). Policies like the CHIPS Act have a profound and rapid effect on their target industry but may cause unintended ripple effects in adjacent sectors (e.g., automotive firms now facing even greater competition for a politically re-allocated chip supply). Understanding these differential impacts is crucial for crafting effective and efficient industrial policy that enhances, rather than inadvertently degrades, national economic security.</p><h3>Limitations and Future Research</h3><p>This study is subject to several limitations that offer avenues for future inquiry. First, our analysis is confined to three industries and large, publicly traded MNCs. Future research should extend this comparative approach to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and other critical sectors like food and agriculture (D’Odorico et al., 2018) or rare earth minerals to test the generalizability of our contingent framework. Second, our use of a macro-level GPR index, while standard, could be complemented by firm-level measures of perceived risk to better understand the role of managerial cognition. Third, the strategies we observe, particularly friendshoring (Chauhan, 2026), are nascent. Longitudinal studies are urgently needed to assess the long-term costs, benefits, and unintended consequences of these profound network reconfigurations. Will these new 'resilient' supply chains be financially sustainable, or will they create new, unforeseen vulnerabilities? This remains a critical open question.
<h2>Conclusion</h2>
<p>This study set out to explore how global supply chains are adapting to an era defined by intensifying geopolitical rivalry. Through a comparative mixed-methods analysis of the automotive, semiconductor, and pharmaceutical industries, we found that firms are not responding to this new reality in a uniform manner. Instead, they are adopting divergent strategies that are deeply contingent on their industry's unique position at the intersection of technology, economics, and national security.</p><p>Our research demonstrates that the semiconductor industry is undergoing a rapid, politically-driven decoupling. The automotive industry is pursuing a more cautious, hybrid approach fraught with the complexities of its legacy systems. The pharmaceutical industry is relying on a pre-existing model of regulated robustness that ensures stability but may lack the agility needed for the future. The overarching conclusion is that in the face of systemic geopolitical risk, the optimal supply chain strategy is not universal but is instead a tailored response to the specific pressures and possibilities of a firm's industrial context.</p><p>We have entered a new paradigm for international business, one in which the political map has become as crucial to navigating global commerce as the logistical one. The relentless pursuit of efficiency that defined the last thirty years is giving way to a more complex and costly search for resilience. This study represents a step towards understanding this new world, providing both a framework for academic inquiry and a set of pragmatic considerations for the managers and policymakers who must navigate it. The era of apolitical efficiency is decisively over; the age of geopolitical resilience has begun, and its rules are still being written, industry by industry.</p>
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