Abstract
This article examines the evolution, role, and changing character of the legislature in Cameroon from the one-party era (1973–1990), through the period of multiparty democratization (1990–2000), and into the present period of competitive authoritarianism. The analysis draws on existing literature, the Cameroonian constitution, and legislation to offer a typology of the changing role of the National Assembly. It argues that the legislature in Cameroon has historically been a key site for political control, helping the executive to consolidate its power, first in a one-party system, and then in a hegemonic dominant party system. However, the study demonstrates that the nature of legislative political control has changed over time. From being a largely rubber-stamp body in the one-party era, the legislature developed into a more active, albeit constrained, body during the period of multiparty democratization. Today, it operates as a tool for managing political competition, legitimizing authoritarian rule, and co-opting political opposition. The analysis also sheds light on the broader issue of legislative development in authoritarian contexts, particularly in Africa, highlighting the complex interplay between institutional design, political reforms, and the enduring quest for executive control.
Keywords
Cameroon, legislature, political control, authoritarianism, multipartyism, National Assembly
Full Text
This article examines the evolution, role, and changing character of the legislature in Cameroon from the one-party era (1973–1990), through the period of multiparty democratization (1990–2000), and into the present period of competitive authoritarianism. The analysis draws on existing literature, the Cameroonian constitution, and legislation to offer a typology of the changing role of the National Assembly. It argues that the legislature in Cameroon has historically been a key site for political control, helping the executive to consolidate its power, first in a one-party system, and then in a hegemonic dominant party system. However, the study demonstrates that the nature of legislative political control has changed over time. From being a largely rubber-stamp body in the one-party era, the legislature developed into a more active, albeit constrained, body during the period of multiparty democratization. Today, it operates as a tool for managing political competition, legitimizing authoritarian rule, and co-opting political opposition. The analysis also sheds light on the broader issue of legislative development in authoritarian contexts, particularly in Africa, highlighting the complex interplay between institutional design, political reforms, and the enduring quest for executive control.