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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Intelligence Gathering in Nigeria in the 21st Century: A Study of Isoko South Local Government Area of Delta State

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ABSTRACT

The world is becoming a volatile place and high-threat environments becoming too dangerous to send personnel, lack of human intelligence has placed a greater stress on, signals intelligence to provide military commanders with greater knowledge of dangerous actors and potential threats. Therefore, this study ascertained intelligence gathering in Nigeria in the 21st century a study of Isoko South Local Government Area of Delta State. The study adopted cross-sectional survey research design from 192 respondents in military and paramilitary establishments in the state and was selected through multi-stage sampling technique. Structural-functional theory and social learning Theory relevant theories reviewed. The study adopted Structural-functional theory as the theoretical framework. Two hypotheses were formulated for the study. The data collected from the respondents were analyzed using chi-square (χ2) statistics. The study also revealed that with the computed χ2 = (N=192), 69.329; df=1, p<.000 the test shows that there is a statistically significant relationship (P<.000) between respondents' educational status and perception of intelligence gathering. The findings also indicated that with the computed χ2 = (N=192), 57.703; df=1, p<.000, the test shows that there is a statistically significant relationship (P<.000) between place of residence and response to intelligence reports. It was therefore recommended that citizen's participation in intelligence gathering should be encouraged. Government should review upwards funds allocated for intelligence activities.

Keywords: *Intelligence Gathering; Crime; Isoko South Local Government Area; Security*

Introduction

Intelligence refers to information that meets the stated, understood needs of policy makers and has been collected, refined and narrowed to meet those needs. Nations require intelligence about their immediate environment and that of other nations. This is necessary because, in order to preserve their security, they need to keep track of internal and external threats (Lowenthal, 2000). Consequently, nations require certain instruments to contain these threats. Also, nations adopt strategies and policies such as defense and security policies to enable them to respond appropriately and safeguard them from both external and internal threats (Enahoro, 2010). Intelligence, as a critical tool of statecraft, provides the necessary warning about imminent threats policy makers in order to protect a nation from being subjected to surprise military attacks. Intelligence as an organization is able to avert imminent threats to a country by providing timely, processed information to national security decision makers. This is achieved through the acquisition of covert information by covert means on the actions, policies and capabilities of other nations. The information, which is of utmost importance to national security, is collected, analyzed and disseminated for use to gathering action. Thus, the role of intelligence is to gathering action that may be deemed necessary in the furtherance of national interests (Lowenthal, 2009). Intelligence is a critical element in the success of all human endeavor, be it in business, governance or military operations. In the context of military operations, intelligence is vital for guiding operations. If the intelligence is right; chances are that the operation will be successful. The significance of this assertion was illustrated in the operations Desert shield and Desert storm in the Persian Gulf War of 1991.

Adequate intelligence was provided to the US military during these operations. The operations were successful due to the accuracy of the in-depth intelligence on enemy vulnerabilities, capabilities and intentions. This enabled the US military to have a full and complete view of the adversary, while military power was directed where it was needed most. Security operations are the procedures and actions taken by security agencies to protect lives and properties in order to ensure there is no state of insecurity within a society. The conduct of security operations in Nigeria is shaped by the peculiarity of the security environment; thus, security operation could be proactive or reactive. When it is proactive, it involves essentially the use of intelligence to avert any threat to national security. These threats could be in the form of sabotage, subversion, terrorism and all other destructive actions that could undermine national security. Reactive security operations involve the use of security apparatuses to contain conflicts that are already on ground. When that happens, states involve security operations that are reactive in nature and the use of military force is employed in conjunction with national intelligence assets to contain threats (Jackson & Scott, 2004).

There has always been a rather healthy tension between the producers of intelligence and the users of intelligence. This is against the backdrop that intelligence operations are not conducted for their own sake, but rather to inform the decisions of those who must act in defense of national security/community safety. The value of intelligence is in the eyes of its users, not its producers; intelligence is at its best when it is fully integrated with its users. These simple truths led to the development of intelligence methodologies and techniques as a function of gathering to specific instruments of national power such as diplomacy, law enforcement, and war fighting. The nature of today's threats has blurred the lines between traditional diplomatic, military, and law enforcement concerns, requiring all instruments of national power to work as a seamless network to defeat our adversaries. The rise of joint task forces, intelligence operations centers, and fusion centers has brought together professionals from across the law enforcement, military, and intelligence communities, offering them a unique opportunity to share tools and techniques in defense of the nation (Baginski, 2007). However, in the face of these realities, and the need to collaborate effectively, intelligence and security agencies the world over have fallen into the trap of non-collaboration and indeed competition thereby attenuating security management and national security.

In Nigeria, this challenge lives with us. Independent intelligence reports have shown lack of cooperation between military intelligence authorities and the state security service on one hand and between the intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies on the other. This apparent anomaly is responsible for the massive intelligence failures in Nigeria and the triumph of domestic terrorists' attacks by Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria. Added to this are proven cases of lack of patriotism, ethnic, religious and political sentiments by security agents. Above all, a major missing link in security management is the alienation of the community in information/intelligence gathering in ways that hurts the nation greatly. Be it the counter insurgency operations in the Niger Delta or Boko Haram in the North, community integration provides the most dependable approach in security management in Nigeria. It is therefore logical by public safety and national security standards for Nigerian intelligence community to witness the current level of massive intelligence failures against Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria where series of successful attacks have cast serious doubts on Nigeria's public safety capabilities. In Nigeria, these internal threats manifest mostly in the

form of communal conflicts, both inter and intra, ethnic, religious as well as finding expression in militant activities. Typical examples of a security operation in Nigeria include the Joint Tasks Force (JTF) Operation RESTORE HOPE in Niger Delta, Op FLUSHOUT III in Rivers State and Op HARMONY IV in the Bakassi Peninsular. The mandate of these security operations was to reverse the state of insecurity in the affected areas.

Nigeria has had to grapple over the years with the challenge of inadequate intelligence sharing amongst its security and law enforcement agencies. The non-effectiveness of the intelligence in gathering of security operations in Nigeria are attributed to inadequate human and technical intelligence capabilities. These are assumption based on public opinion of intelligence failure. The study seeks to confirm these hypotheses. The intelligence component of the JTF Op RESTORE HOPE for instance is composed of a detachment of the Nigerian Army Intelligence Corps (NAIC), State Security Service (SSS) Task Force Group and intelligence element of the Nigerian Navy (NN) and Nigerian Air Force Task Force Groups. The JTF intelligence component would require collaborative efforts between the military intelligence and SSS Task Force Group.

Recent events in the Nigeria, which include; the Boko Haram saga and the recurrent Jos Plateau sectarian crises among others have thrown up arguments on the level and quality of the intelligence gathering provided for national security. Within the military that plays a leading role in operations, there are three schools of thought amongst commanders. In the first school of thought are some commanders whose opinion is that intelligence as practiced in Nigeria is not real time and therefore does not add value to operations. A second school of thought believes that intelligence management in Nigeria lacks analytical skills and is therefore unable to predict events correctly. The third school of thought like Clausewitz and Tolstoy believes that intelligence in operation is unreliable and therefore not needed. The arguments on the need for intelligence or lack of it when critically dissected are premised on the use of technology such as communication facilities, satellites, sensor equipment and computers that are essential input to the production of intelligence. In other words, it amplifies the fact that technology is not an end itself, but the means to process and pass intelligence in gathering of the commander and the mission (Ilogho, 2006).

The lack of real time intelligence and lack of analytical skills to predict incident accurately before, during and after they occur as well as intelligence as a product being unreliable during operations, are some of the issues that have created doubt in the quality of intelligence available to military commanders. This has further created a dilemma between military commanders and the intelligence staff on the necessity to rely on intelligence as one of the determinants of success in operations (ibid). It is the need for the resolution of these arguments that has aroused this researcher's interest in the matter. Thus, this study sets out to find out intelligence gathering in Nigeria in the 21st century: a study of Isoko South Local Government Area, of Delta State through the following questions:

I. Does level of education of officers influence their view of intelligent gathering in Isoko South LGA
II. Does place of residence of officers influence their response to intelligent reports in Isoko South LGA

Literature Review

The role of intelligence in national security has increased in significance as a tool of state policy. Thus, Michael Herman thinks that intelligence is a form of state power in its own right (Jackson & Scott, 2004). This concept of intelligence as a form of power is based on the definition of power by Lawrence Freedman. Freedman defined power as "the capacity to produce effects that are more advantageous than would have been otherwise been (Herman, 1996). This concept has not captured the basic processes involved in intelligence production.

Conversely, John Ferris has a different view and posited that intelligence is "not a form of power but a means to guide its use, whether as combat multiple or by helping one to understand one's environment and options. Thus, it relates to how to apply force or leverage and against whom. Furthermore, he believes that intelligence involved the collection and analysis of information which allows the use of resource in the most effective way possible against rivals who are doing the same. He therefore concluded that the knowledge (commonly referred to as intelligence) derived from the information collected is for the purpose of gathering an action, the concept dwelled more on the application and usage of intelligence. Though it captures some aspects of intelligence process, it cannot satisfy the requirement for this study (Ferris & Handel, 1995).

Lowenthal (2009) on his own part defines intelligence as, the process by which specific types of information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed and provided to policymakers; the products of that process; the safe guarding of these processes and this information by counter intelligence activities; and the carrying out operations as requested by lawful authorities. The essential elements involved in the intelligence process are

captured in the concept, which are collection and analysis involved in the processing of information. It is the analysis of raw information that leads to the finished product, which is intelligence. Therefore, without analysis there cannot be intelligence. The term intelligence here also refers to the organization that is primarily involved in the chain of activities in the processing of Information.

Beyond the organization level, intelligence is described in the concept as a profession that carries out certain activities such as intelligence activities. The tri-dimensional feature of this concept of intelligence provided a broad perspective in dealing with every aspect of intelligence as it relates to military operations. Assistance in this context implies input which would enhance expertise or capabilities. A synergy of these definitions would meet the requirement of this study. In this study, the research defines intelligence gathering as input resulting from information concerning domestic environment or areas of operations that has been collected, processed, analyzed and the safeguarding of the product and process which is provided to security policy makers to guide decision or actions in gathering of operations. Intelligence gathering is the process of managing and organizing the collection of intelligence from various sources.

However, structural functional theory was adopted as theoretical framework. The theory focuses on the assumption that the society is a single, interconnected system, each element of which performs a specific function, The analysis further explains activities in relation to the role they play in keeping a given system in a proper working order and thus maintain its equilibrium, in other words, every system is made up of subsystems or part which work for the maintenance of the system (Ujo, 2008). According to According to Merton, (1968), a system is comprehensive in the sense that it includes all the interactions-inputs as well as output. Functional approach to structures within the political system is therefore through their functions. These functions were classified into input and output. Although the theory provides a comprehensive analytical tool for an understanding of the role of institutions in a political system, it has been criticized over the years by various theorists. The theory has been criticized for being unable to account for social change. The theory has been said to be teleological. In other words, it attempts to describe social institution solely through their effects and does not explain causes of these effects. Despite these criticisms, the theory still has significant relevance to the understanding of the role, structure and functions of political institutions in political systems. The theory is relevant to this study by virtue of its theoretical construct that emphasis on the analysis of the functions of institutions. By identifying and understanding the functions of these institutions in a political system, it enables one to be able to understand the positive roles they play in the maintenance of social order and control. The theory wills therefore often a better understanding of the role and function of the intelligence arm of the state, in providing relevant intelligence gathering to assist the state in taking informed decisions at both the strategic and operational levels with regard to the need to undertake security operations in Nigeria (Ebulue, 2007).

Methods

The study was carried out in Isoko South is a Local Government Area (LGA) of Delta State with headquarters at Ozoro. The study adopted the cross-sectional survey design in generating data to answer the research questions as well as test the hypotheses. This research design is appropriate for collecting information from a section of a study population and also allows the use of a selected sample to describe or represent a large population at a given point in time. The target population for the study constitutes military and paramilitary officers. It has a population of 235,147 (NPC 2006). A sample size of 192 respondents was selected through the multi-stage sampling procedure and purposive technique while the questionnaire was used as instrument for data collection. Descriptive statistics was employed for data analysis

Findings

Table 1: Distribution of Respondents by Place of Residence

Place of residence	Frequency	Percent
Rural	120	62.5
Urban	72	37.5
Total	192	100.0

Table 1 above shows distribution of respondents by place of residence. It shows that 62.5% of the respondents reside in the rural and 37.5% were urban residents. This shows that majority of the respondents (62.5%) reside in the rural areas.

Table 2: Distribution of Respondents by Educational Qualification

Educational qualification		Frequency	Percent
	Primary education	52	27.1
	Secondary education	80	41.7
	NCE/OND	44	22.9
	Degree	16	8.3
	Total	192	100.0

Table 2 above shows the distribution of respondents by age bracket. It shows that 40.1% of the respondents were within 18-27 years, 33.3% were within 28-37 years, 18.2% of the respondents were within 38-47 years, 8.3% of the respondents were within 48 years and above. This shows that majority of the respondents (40.1%) were within 18-27 years

Test of Hypotheses
Hypothesis One

Substantive hypothesis: educated officers are more likely to have positive view of intelligence gathering than less educated officers

Null hypothesis: There is no significant relationship between education and view of intelligence gathering

Significant Level: A significance level (α) of 0.05 was used in testing this hypothesis.

Decision Rule: The decision rule states that if $p \leq .05$ reject the null hypothesis (H_0), but if $p > .05$, accept the null hypothesis

Table 3: Cross tabulation of educational status and perception of intelligence gathering

Educational status	Perception		Total
	Positive perception	**Negative perception**	
More educated	60 (100.0%)	0 (0.0%)	60 (100.0%)
Less educated	47(35.6%)	85(64.4%)	132 (100.0%)
Total	**107(55.7%)**	**85(44.3%)**	**192(100.0%)**

χ2 = (N=192), 69.329; df=1, p<.000 ***Source: fieldwork 2018***

Table 3, presents data on which hypothesis one is tested. To test the hypothesis, educational status of respondents was cross tabulated with perception of intelligence gathering. The result shows that 100.0% of all those who are more educated perceived intelligence gathering as positive**.** On the other hand, of all those who are less educated 35.6% perceived intelligence gathering as positive and 64.4% perceived

However, with the computed χ2 = (N=192), 69.329; df=1, p<.000 the test shows that there is a statistically significant relationship (P<.000) between respondents' educational status and perception of intelligence gathering. Therefore, the substantive hypothesis which state educated officers are more likely to have positive view of intelligence gathering than less educated officers is hereby accepted. As a result, the null hypothesis which states that there is no significant relationship between educational status of respondents and perception of intelligent gathering is hereby rejected

Hypothesis Two

Substantive Hypothesis: Officers who served in rural areas are more likely to respond quickly to intelligent reports than those who serve in urban areas.

Null Hypothesis: There is no significant relationship between place of residence and response to intelligence reports

Significant Level: A significance level (α) of 0.05 was used in testing this hypothesis.

Decision Rule: The decision rule states that if $p \leq .05$ reject the null hypothesis (H_o), but if $p > .05$, accept the null hypothesis.

Table 4: Cross tabulation of place of residence and response to intelligence reports

Place of residence	Response to intelligence reports		Total
	Quick response	Not quick response	
Rural	113 (94.2%)	7 (5.8%)	120 (100.0%)
Urban	33(45.8%)	39(54.2%)	72(100.0%)
Total	**146 (76.0%)**	**46(24.0%)**	**192(100.0%)**

χ2 = (N=192), 57.703; df=1, p<.000 ***Source: Fieldwork 2018***

Table 4, presents data on which hypothesis one is tested. To test the hypothesis, place of residence was cross tabulated with response to intelligence reports. The result shows that 94.2% of respondents who reside in rural areas accepted that officers who serve in rural areas in rural areas are more likely quickly to intelligent reports while 5.8% did not accept that officers who serve in rural areas in rural areas are more likely quickly to intelligent reports. On the other hand, 45.8% of the urban residents accepted that officers who serve in rural areas in rural areas are more likely quickly to intelligent reports and 54.2% did not accept that officers who serve in rural areas in rural areas are more likely quickly to intelligent reports**.**

However, with the computed χ2 = (N=192), 57.703; df=1, p<.000, the test shows that there is a statistically significant relationship (P<.000) between place of residence and response to intelligent reports. Therefore, the substantive hypothesis which states that officers who serve in rural areas in rural areas are more likely quickly to intelligent reports than those who do not is hereby accepted. As a result, the null hypothesis which states that there is no significant relationship between place of residence and response to intelligence reports is hereby rejected.

Discussion

The study ascertained intelligence gathering in Nigeria in the 21st century a study of Enugu state. The study answered questions on intelligence gathering in Nigeria in the 21st century. The findings show majority of the respondents accepted that they know about intelligence gathering. The findings revealed that majority of the respondents (30.8%) agreed that non-citizens participation in intelligence is what they what they think is the factor hindering intelligence gathering**.** The study also found that majority of the respondents (45.3%) agreed that what they think is one of the ways of intelligence gathering is covert human intelligence sources or "agents". On what can be done to improve intelligence gathering, the result indicated that majority of the respondents (36.5%) affirmed building strong relationships with the public should be adopted.

The study also revealed that with the computed χ2 = (N=192), 69.329; df=1, p<.000 the test shows that there is a statistically significant relationship (P<.000) between respondents' educational status and perception of intelligence gathering. The findings also indicated that with the computed χ2 = (N=192), 57.703; df=1, p<.000, the test shows that there is a statistically significant relationship (P<.000) between place of residence and response to intelligence reports.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study sought to ascertain intelligence gathering in Nigeria in the 21st century a study of Enugu state. However, with the world becoming a more volatile place and certain high-threat environments becoming too dangerous to send personnel, the lack of human intelligence has placed a greater stress on signals intelligence to provide military

commanders with greater knowledge of dangerous actors and potential threats. Based on the findings the following recommendations were made:

I. Citizen's participation in intelligence gathering should be encouraged
II. Government should review upwards funds allocated for intelligence activities
III. Adoption of commercial intelligence networks should be encouraged
IV. Government and security agencies should build strong relationships with the public

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